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Abstract
E SSAYS ON THE EDUCATION PRODUCTION FUNCTION
by
DANIEL L D ENCH

Adviser: Professor TJ Joyce

This dissertation consists of three chapters which test interventions along several dimensions of the
education production function.

Chapter 1

In chapter one, I run a field experiment comparing the effect of two interventions,

(1) an email nudge telling students similar problems to their homework will be on the exam and
(2) grading the homework, on attempting homework. I find both interventions increase homework
attempts: nudging by 3 percentage points and grading by 72 percentage points. Instrumenting for
the effect of attempting the homework using grading, I find that attempting problems from the
homework leads to an increase in the probability of getting similar problems on the exam correct by
3.4 percentage points. Higher than median GPA students are more responsive to both interventions
to increase homework attempts, despite spending more time on all other online activities. Evidence
suggests, however, that higher and lower than median GPA students are equally productive learners
given equal effort.

Chapter 2

In the second chapter, we use a randomized control design to test whether inform-

ing students that we can detect plagiarism reduces cheating. We further test whether informing
students that they have been caught cheating reduces subsequent cheating attempts. We find that
informing students about our system’s plagiarism detection has little effect on cheating. Further,
we find informing students they have been caught cheating reduces subsequent cheating attempts
substantially.

v
Chapter 3 In the third chapter, we explore a fundamental question for policymakers: whether students of differing preparation levels are affected equally by offers to the same schools. Educational
Option programs in NYC make 50% of their high school offers to students through a screening
process and 50% through lotteries. We use lottery assignment to estimate the effect of school offers
for students that just miss screening cutoffs. We use the same lottery process to estimate the effect
of the same school offers on less prepared lottery students far away from the cutoff. We find that
students are affected similarly by school offers regardless of whether they are close or far away
from the cutoff.
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Chapter 1
Nudges versus incentives: a field experiment
to motivate students
Author: Daniel Dench (CUNY)

1.1

Introduction

Over the past 20 years bachelor’s degree attainment has been stagnant even as returns to higher
education have increased (Bowen et al., 2009). One possible explanation is tab:that growth in
cost of higher education, brought on in part by state funding declines (Ma et al., 2018), may be
crimping demand (Deming et al., 2015). A competing theory is that students may seek to capitalize
on these higher returns, with nearly 70% of young adults having attended some college, but lack
the motivation and non-cognitive skills to complete the work required for higher degrees with a
little more than a third completing a bachelor’s degree (Oreopoulos and Petronijevic, 2019). In fact,
Bowen et al. (2009) estimates that first year grades have an independent effect on student graduation
rates apart from socio-economic characteristics, SAT scores, and high school grade point average
(GPA), implying efforts to increase student grades through motivation can increase retention.
The purpose of this field experiment is to compare two interventions to motivate students to
complete homework problem sets and to test whether this increased motivation has an effect on
1
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exam performance. The first intervention is an email nudge telling students similar problems to their
homework are likely to appear on the exam. I do this by nudging six out of 12 homework problem
sets from selected chapters. The second intervention is to count homework towards students’ grades.
I do this by randomizing students into two groups, assigning each group a set of six out of 12
homework problem sets as graded that the comparison group receives as recommended. To test
the effect of increased motivation on exam performance, 12 similar problems to the homework
appear on students’ midterms and finals. The experimental setting takes place in the context of
reduced-lecture intro to microeconomics classes.
An expansive literature tests how student effort can be motivated by nudging (Damgaard and
Nielsen, 2018) and yet few find effects on medium and long run outcomes. With a sample size of
approximately 25,000 students, Oreopoulos and Petronijevic (2019) test whether promising nudge
interventions from the literature have an impact on student outcomes. While they find that the most
costly intervention increases motivation marginally, the changes in behavior are not large enough
to detect any effect on GPA or retention. While nudge interventions may come at little cost, the
literature lacks the power to detect reduced form effects on outcomes, making cost-benefit analysis
intractable.
An alternative way to motivate students with possibly greater effect is to change their underlying
incentives for work. Indeed a small literature on grading students shows that it improves their
course grades (Romer, 1993; Grodner and Rupp, 2013; Grove and Wasserman, 2006). With all the
attention paid to nudging, it is surprising that incentive-based interventions have not been more
thoroughly explored. While changing incentives more directly comes at the cost of altering students’
choice architecture (Thaler, 2018), this cost should be weighed against the much larger increase in
effort. Placing both types of interventions in the same experiment, I can benchmark the relative
importance of nudges in comparison to incentives.
Increasing the share of students taking all online courses by 10 percent reduces the monetary cost
of education by approximately 1.4 percent (Deming et al., 2015). Evidence for preserving human
capital formation with reduced class time is mixed. Using a randomized experiment Bowen et al.
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(2014) finds that taking an online statistics course with the same material instead of a traditional
format yields the same results in terms of test scores. By contrast, two other experiments (Joyce
et al., 2015; Alpert et al., 2016) and an instrumental variable approach (Bettinger et al., 2017)
find reducing class time and increasing shares of online classes do have negative effects on school
performance. Joyce et al. (2015) find that hours spent using online materials does not significantly
increase with half the lecture time, suggesting that sufficient compensation for reduced lecture
time may be lacking. Using reduced lecture classes as the backdrop for this experiment seems
appropriate given the benefit of savings if we can preserve human capital formation by increasing
motivation.
I find that telling a student that a similar problem to their problem set is likely to be on the exam
increases the likelihood that they attempt a problem set by 3.0 percentage points. By comparison,
grading a problem set increases the likelihood of trying a problem by 71.8 percentage points. Further
attempting problem sets, instrumented by grading, increases the probability of getting the correct
answer on similar problems on the exam by 3.4 percentage points. Students with greater than
median GPA have a larger response on attempting a problem set to both nudging and grading. The
effect of attempting a practice problem on performance on the exam, however, does not vary by
GPA.
This paper advances the literature in two ways. First, I can follow students through the education
production function; from what influences their allocation of time on specific homework problem
sets, to how spending time on these problem sets influence their outcomes. This allows me to make
important observations about whether low GPA students are held back by less time input or by less
productive time input. Second, I show how in order to measure the effects of behavioral changes
from nudges on outcomes, it helps to have a second intervention that shifts the same behavior more
substantially. Including incentive-based interventions in nudge experiments may allow researchers
to more cost effectively recover effects on outcomes from behavioral shifts.
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Experiments in higher education to increase effort

Although shifting incentives can have substantial effect on behavior, these shifts may come at
greater cost than is a benefit to agents excluding the incentive. Nudges are low cost transfers of
knowledge about the cost or benefit of a behavior. Policymakers can choose nudges over incentives
when they want to influence behavior without exerting external costs on agents in order to better
preserve individual cost-benefit considerations (Thaler, 2018).
To improve long-term student outcomes with only small inputs, Dobronyi et al. (2019) conduct
a large multi-campus field experiment to look at how goal-setting and mindset trainings, both with
and without reminders, influence study effort. The initial intervention took only 2 to 2.5 hours to
complete. They failed to reject the null that the trainings, regardless of reminders, have an effect on
outcomes such as grades or retention.
Oreopoulos and Petronijevic (2019) look at the effect of text-based and in-person coaching
on effort. They find while in-person coaching increases study time by approximately 0.1 to 0.2
standard deviations (S.D.), it results in no detectable effects on student grade or retention. Since
effort is self-reported, it is hard to prove there are no differential social desirability effects.
In a more proximate outcome to the treatment, Smith et al. (2018) attempt to increase student
effort on activities. They randomly assign students on each homework and email the treatment
group to inform them about how much each problem set is worth and what score they need on the
next problem set to increase their grade. They find that this nudge increases scores on problem sets
by approximately 10 percent, or less than 0.1 S.D. Unfortunately, the effect size is too small to
identify any subsequent outcome.
Wozny et al. (2018) test whether randomly assigning a lesson to be taught as “flipped” rather
than as a traditional lecture format increases performance on assessments related to that lecture.
Identification comes from randomly assigning lecture types to classrooms with randomly selected
students. They find that “flipping” a classroom increases retention of the relevant material by 0.16
S.D. but that the effect persists in the long term only for students with above-median GPAs.
Patterson (2018) finds that they can improve online learning through behavioral tools that
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commit students to limiting their distraction time. They also employ tools that, once students are
logged in their course website, stop students from spending time on non-educational websites and
alert students when they are spending time on distracting websites. Only the commitment device
has an effect, but the effect is substantial. Students that commit to only a specific amount of time
distracted spend 24 percent more time working on their coursework, improve course grades by 0.29
S.D., and are 40 percent more likely to complete the course.
Damgaard and Nielsen (2018) reviews the literature on social comparisons on effort. The effects
on learning outcomes range from negative to positive. It is therefore difficult to sort out whether
these differences are related to experimental design differences or simply random differences
between experiments.
Grading problem sets, although studied less frequently, induces larger shifts in student outcomes
than those reported in the nudging literature. Romer (1993) shows that students that complete all
problem sets, controlling for prior characteristics and attendance, increase their performance by
about half a letter grade. Grove and Wasserman (2006) use a natural experiment, in which a fluke
lead to half of students being graded and the other half not being graded. Despite all other materials
being the same in the course, he found that on average grading problem sets increased scores on the
exam by 2.3 percentage points, with the effect being concentrated among average students. Finally,
Grodner and Rupp (2013) find that randomizing students between all their homework being graded
or not increases submission rates substantially and scores on the exam by 5 to 6 percentage points.
The effects are larger for students that do poorly on the first exam. These papers did not measure
intensity of effort on homework. Therefore, it is difficult to say whether differences in the effect of
homework between high achieving and low achieving students come from more time input, or more
productive time input.
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A model of student effort on problem sets
Objective Function

I start from the assumption that students are solely interested in obtaining a grade1 (S) which yields
a benefit at the rate of w, which captures all monetary and non-monetary compensation for the
higher grade. I will also assume that there are three things that determine S: ability (A), classroom
capital (K), and allocated time to homework in the class (E). I will also assume that students choose
E, which is costly and possibly related to A, to maximize the following objective function

wS(E, K, A) − c(E, A).

(1.1)

I will assume A and K are held fixed upon selection of a classroom and abstract away from them. S
is defined as an identity by two components, performance on exams (X) which are a function of E,
and performance on homework (Q)2 is a function of E for a give student so that

S = (1 − Λ)X(E) + ΛQ(E).

(1.2)

Where Λ equals the share of a student’s grade that belongs to all homework and is a number between
0 and 1. I can break Q up into independent problem sets so that

Q=

n
X

λt qt (et ).

(1.3)

t

In this case, t indexes the problem set, and n is the number of problem sets. λt equals the share that
each problem set is worth towards Q. The grade on each problem set is of course determined by et .
X is itself a function of et on each of these problem sets with a weight of ρt on the exam so that
1

I choose to use grades instead of human capital (H) as was used in a similar model in Dee and Jacob (2012) The
value of grading could be the human capital formation it represents or the signal it sends to the market. I remain agnostic
as to which is more important as it does not affect any of the predictions from my model.
2
I use homework here for simplification purposes, but any learning activities which contribute to retention of
knowledge students use on the exam could apply here as well, including attendance, participation, and readings.
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n
X
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ρt xt (et ).

(1.4)

t

ρt represents the fraction of questions on an exam related to problem set qt and multiplies a function
of et . Students lack information about whether the size of ρt is zero or some positive number. They
therefore sometimes ask the question “Professor, will this be on the exam?”.
I will also assume that the cost functions for each problem set is separable so that

C=

n
X

ct (et ).

(1.5)

t

Now plug the equations for C, Q and X back into the objective function. I get

w[(1 − Λ)

n
X

ρt xt (et ) + Λ

t

1.3.2

n
X

λt qt (et )] −

t

n
X

ct (et ).

(1.6)

t

Optimization and predictions

Note that xt , qt and ct are all strictly increasing functions with respect to et . Now I differentiate
with respect to the choice variable et for t=j and set equal to 0. Note that because all functions with
et are linearly separable, all terms where t 6= j drop out of the model and I am left with

w[(1 − Λ)ρj

∂cj
∂xj
∂qj
+ Λλj
]=
.
∂ej
∂ej
∂ej

(1.7)

Since all function are increasing in ej , assuming xj and qj are concave functions in ej and that
cj is a convex function in ej 3 , this equation has at least one positive solution in ej and this solution
is increasing in ρj and λj . These are the parameters I manipulate for this experiment. For example,
by telling students a problem is likely to be on the exam, I increase ρj . Further, when a problem is
graded it increases λj from zero to 1/25th , 2/25ths or 3/25ths .4
3

These are standard assumptions in a cost benefit framework.
Of course, student expectations about ρt might also be a function of λt since students may take it as additional
information of how important professors perceive an problem set to be for X. My primary concern in this paper is not
with how ρt increases with λt but rather with how much additional E will be exerted from the answer to the question
“Professor, will this be on the exam?”, and varying λt serves as a good comparison for the relative effect size of giving
4
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Ordering expectations

I will order my expected responses in effort with respect to grading and nudging interventions. In
this experiment, each question on an exam is worth approximately 1.125 percentage points towards
a student’s final grade, which I will round down to 1 percentage point for simplification purposes.
Let’s suppose that ρj moves from zero to one when students are told problems like it are likely to
appear on the exam. I made the homework problem sets worth a minimum of 1 percentage point
on their final grade, so (1 − Λ)ρj and Λλj are equal when a homework problem set is worth 1
percentage point.
Therefore the relative payoff to students in the nudging and grading interventions are approx∂x

∂q

imately w[ ∂ejj ] and w[ ∂ejj ] when homework problems are worth 1 percentage point towards the
final grade. The relative behavioral changes are therefore approximately related to the relative
sizes of

∂xj
∂ej

and

∂qj
.
∂ej

A priori, there is good reason to believe that

∂qj
∂ej

>

∂xj
∂ej

since students are

allowed unrestricted time, access to their textbooks, the internet, and whatever else they need while
completing problem sets. By contrast, students must work on their exams using only the knowledge
they have brought with them from prior work in a limited time frame.
Students beliefs about

∂qj
∂ej

and

∂xj
∂ej

may also influence how students respond to increases in λj

and ρj . For example, for students that have experienced some success with how their time input
influences their grade in the past, may be more responsive to information about whether a problem
will be on the test and whether a problem set is graded or not. In addition, students may have much
different function of

∂cj
,
∂ej

which may influence how they respond to interventions to increase time

input.
information on ρt . Also it is a powerful tool in observing the effects of ej on answering components of X correctly.
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Experimental setup
Setting

The study took place at a college within eight large sections of principles of microeconomics during
the Spring semester of 2018. These sections were reduced time formats, where lecture was held
once a week for 75 minutes, instead of the typical twice a week 75 minute lectures. In a typical
semester, students receive access to an online proprietary software system that includes a digital
copy of a popular textbook, problem sets, flashcards, informational videos, and other activities
added by the professor. In each chapter, pre-lecture quizzes accompany the readings that students
are supposed to have completed before the lecture. Chapters also include post-lecture quizzes,
graded problem sets, which are more challenging and time consuming than the pre-lecture quiz and
a recommended problem set, an ungraded problem set.
Before the semester began, I randomly assigned students into two groups, henceforth group A
and group B. Group A and group B students in each class received an email with a syllabus that
contained instructions on how to enroll in an online learning platform; the enrollment code differed
depending on their group. The platforms between groups in each class were identical, except
for experimental chapters in which the treatment took place. Other than the treatment described
hereafter, students within classes received the same access to resources and materials.5
In the six experimental chapters there were a total of 12 problem sets, six graded and six
recommended. Recommending a problem means that it is worth zero percent towards their final
grade. The problems were guided in the sense that student attempts were immediately graded with
extensive feedback for incorrect answers. Students were allowed three attempts but the problem
varied slightly in each attempt. The student’s score on the problem set was the average of all
their attempts and was reported to the student regardless of whether the problem was graded or
recommended. Students only received credit based on this score if the problem set was graded.
5

The participation in this experiment was 100 percent of all students enrolled in reduced time classes. The reason is
that I asked for and received a waiver of consent from the institutional review board. A discussion of this can be found
in Appendix A.
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Each of the 12 problem sets is assigned to either being nudged or not nudged. Students that
received the problem set as graded were sent the following email nudge for as an example chapter
5: "We strongly recommend that you give the Chapter 5 Post-Lecture Quiz your full attention. A
question or questions like these are likely to appear on the exam. Please note this problem set
accounts for 1% toward your final grade." Students that were nudged for recommended problems
were told: "We strongly recommend that you become comfortable with Chapter 5 Recommend
Practice Problems. Although they do not count towards your grade, questions like these are likely
to appear on the exam."

1.4.2

Identification of nudging and grading on attempting a problem

My goal is to test whether informational nudges regarding the relevance of concepts to exams affects
whether students attempt a problem. I contrast the effect of information nudges to the effect of
grading a problem, an intervention more commonly used to induce student effort. Grading and
nudging can be thought of as two distinct interventions. To illustrate, consider the two by two
in Table 1.1. I show the assigned treatments across two representative problem sets, 1 and 7, for
group A and group B. Just like the canonical difference in difference table, there are four cells
with the groups atop the columns and the problem sets, similar to the time dimension, down the
rows. Cell a represents the probability that students attempt a problem if the problems are graded
and students are nudged. Cell b show the same probability when problems are recommended and
students are nudged. This difference, (a − b), is the effect of grading a problem on the likelihood
students attempt it. The difference, (c − d), also contrasts the probability of attempting a problem
between those that are graded versus recommended but absent any nudge as to their relevance on the
exam. Each of these first difference provides an unbiased estimate because students are randomized
between groups A and B.
Taking the difference between rows within columns, a − c and b − d, we can compute the effect
of telling a student a problem is likely to be on the exam for both graded problems and recommended
problems, respectively. These effects are identified across problem sets. For these differences we
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must assume nothing about the differences between the problem sets other than the nudge affects
whether students attempt a problem. Is this a good assumption? Students know nothing about the
relative difficulty of a problem set that is nudged and a problem set that is not nudged before opening
it at which point an attempt is recorded. Therefore, they should treat problem sets equivalently in
whether they attempt it.

1.4.3

Varying the grading intervention

Furthermore, I examine whether there is a dose response to grading. The grading treatment on the
homework was varied as a percentage towards students’ final grade. For example, chapter 1 problem
set 1 was worth 1 percent toward a student’s final grade for Group A and zero percent for Group
B. Chapter 2 problem set 3 was worth 2 percent towards a student’s final grade for Group A and
zero percent for Group B, and chapter 3 problem set 5 was worth 3 percent towards students’ final
grades. Group B received a problem set worth 1, 2 and 3 percentage points towards their final grade
for chapter 1 problem set 2, chapter 2 problem set 4, and chapter 3, problem set 6, respectively. This
pattern repeats for chapters 4-6. For a full accounting of these treatments, see table 1.8 in appendix
B.6

1.4.4

The effect on the exam

I also want to test the effectiveness of problem sets with instant grading and feedback on their
probability of retaining concepts they learned in the process of attempting the problem. On each
professor’s midterm, I insert six multiple-choice problems from the 3 experimental chapters from
the first half of the course, which were directly related to the concepts from the six graded and
recommended problem sets. The final was a common final across classes and included another set
6

Should I worry that identification for nudging works across chapters which are worth different percentages towards
students’ final grade? Across the six experimental chapters there are two pairs of problem sets that are worth 1%
towards students final grade for each group, two pairs that are worth 2%, and two pairs that are worth 3%. The only
difference between these identical pairs of graded problem sets is the chapter in which they appear and whether they
were nudged. Therefore, I can control for the percent towards a students final grade a problem is worth, and still include
nudges and the interaction with grading in my empirical specifications.
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of six multiple-choice problems from the three experimental chapters from the second half of the
semester. The questions on the exam varied in the closeness with which they mirrored the online
problems so that I could test for heterogeneity of effects from rote to deeper understanding.7
Since grading problem sets was randomized between groups, I rely on this exogenous treatment
to estimate the effect of attempting a problem on the probability of getting the correct answer on
the exam. A priori, I expect the effect of grading to be large and strongly significant on whether
a student attempts a problem set. Each problem set is itself its own grading experiment, so I can
get the reduced form and IV estimates for attempting a practice problem heterogeneously across
problem sets.
Why not simply look at the difference on the exam for similar problems to graded and recommended problem sets without randomization? Ex ante, I did not have a way to estimate how difficult
students would find my designed exam problems and it depends on K in that semester as well as A
for the students, both of which I cannot predict. Randomized grading, under the assumption the
behavioral effects would be large, was therefore the best way to learn about the effect of problem
set attempts on correctly answering similar problems on exams.8

1.4.5

Sample assignment and attrition

Figure 1.1 shows how the sample was split and progressed over the semester. Note that seven
students from assigned group A and seven students from assigned group B signed up for the opposite
group’s online modules. This could only have occurred because they requested a syllabus from a
student in the opposite assigned group. I treat them as assigned to the group for which they enrolled
rather than the syllabus they received. Since they make up only 1.6% of the sample, inclusion or
exclusion of this group does not change the results in any relevant way. Also, treating them as
assigned to their syllabus group does not change the results. Further shown is that of the 833 that
7

While I cannot share the practice questions, which belong to proprietary software sold by a major textbook
distributor, I can share questions included on exams in Appendix C. Also you can see table 1.9 for what changed
between the practice questions and the test questions.
8
This trial was pre-registered on January 12, 2018 and the RCT ID was AEARCTR-0002669.
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were included in the original sample, 738 made it to take the final. Also, note, that the attrition rate
is nearly identical between groups, 12.2% for group A and 12.7% for group B.

1.5

Empirical specification

1.5.1

Time spent specifications

One way to think about this experiment is simply as a number of pooled experiments across problem
sets. In order to pool experiments to get the average effect across experiments I specify a model
such that

ait = α0 + α1 Git + α2 Nt + α3 Git × Nt + ωt + νi + ηit .

(1.8)

ait represents the probability that a student i attempts a problem set t. Git equals one if a problem is
graded, zero otherwise. Nt equals one if a problem is nudged, zero otherwise. Since nudges occur
both for graded problems and recommended problems, I include an interaction Nt × Git . α2 + α3
tells you how nudging a graded problem set increases the probability of an attempt. Students receive
one nudged problem per chapter. I include chapter fixed effects, ωt and student fixed effects, νi ,
to absorb residual variation. Both sets of fixed effects are uncorrelated with the three variables of
interest, since grading is randomized and each student receives a nudge for at least one of their
problem sets within each chapter.
In addition, I can estimate models that look at time spent on a problem and score conditional
on an attempt. Since time spent and score can vary depending on the difficulty of a problem set,
however, I am not able to say that the estimate of nudging a problem on time spent and score is
unbiased. These models may provide useful descriptive information and unbiased estimates of
grading a problem, and so I will estimate them.
In addition, I will estimate models where I drop nudging and the interaction term and estimate
the effect of grading but using problem set fixed effects instead of chapter fixed effects. Nudging
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cannot be included in these models because problem sets are either nudged or not nudged. Finally,
I will look at dose response models by replacing Git with three dummy variables that indicate
whether the problem is worth 1%, 2% or 3% towards a students final grade.

1.5.2

The effects of grading and attempting problems on exams

I specify a reduced form model as

cit = β0 + β1 Git + ψt + υi + it .

(1.9)

cit is the probability of getting similar problems to problem set t correct on the exam. Problem
set and person fixed effects absorb residual variation but are unnecessary for generating unbiased
estimates for grading. To measure the effect of attempting a problem on getting that problem correct
on an exam, I need only a single valid instrument. If the effects of grading in the first-stage are
sufficiently large, which a priori is expected, I can use this to estimate the effect of ait on getting
similar problems from these problem sets correct on the exam. I can also estimate heterogeneous
effects of attempts across problem sets. This allows me to say something qualitatively about how
my intervention varies across concepts and the degree to which I alter problems from the homework
on exams.9

1.5.3

Estimation

All first-stage and reduced form models are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS). The
second-stage equations are estimated using two-stage least squares. All results are clustered at the
student level since there are multiple problem sets and exam question observations for each student.
9

I cannot estimate the effect of nudges on getting similar problems to those nudged correct on the exam. The
reason is that I did not balance problem set difficulty across problem sets that were nudged and those that were not
nudged. Given that nudging occurs between problems, the effect of nudging on getting similar problems on the exam
correct is therefore potentially biased. With a larger sample of problem sets, I could have randomly assigned nudging to
problem sets, and problem set difficulty could be balanced across problem sets. Alternatively, if I had an additional
randomization dimension I could also estimate the effect. I chose not to randomize groups that were nudged and those
that were not nudged because I wanted power to detect reduced form effects in the second-stage and splitting the sample
would lower my ability to do so.
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Since randomization takes place within classroom at the student level, classroom clustering is not
necessary (Abadie et al., 2017).

1.6

Results

1.6.1

Balance

Student characteristics by group are shown in Table 1.2. The randomization process yields characteristics across groups very close to one another. Group B had GPAs that were marginally significantly
different from group A, but this difference is only about 1/7 of a S.D. in GPA in my sample. In
addition, because of the crossover design, I use student fixed effects to minimize the effect of any
random differences in characteristics on the results. A joint chi-square test of the assignment to
group A or group B on characteristics shows balance at p=0.176 at the beginning of the semester
and p=0.148 at the end of the semester.

1.6.2

Effect of Nudges and Grades on Attempts

The first-stage results in Table 1.3, column 1, shows the effect of my two treatments using student
and chapter fixed effects. Grading a problem set increases the probability that it will be attempted
for problems that are not nudged by 71.8 percentage points with a standard error of 1.3 percentage
points. By comparison, telling someone a problem like the recommended problem set is likely
to be on the exam increases the probability that a person attempts it by 3.0 percentage points
with a standard error of 0.8 percentage points. Telling them the same about their graded problem
set increases the probability of an attempt by 1.8 percentage points with a standard error of 0.7
percentage points.10 These results are not different if I remove chapter and student fixed effects.
Excluding nudges and the interaction but including problem fixed effects barely alters the effect of
grading on attempts.
10

This is the estimated linear combination of the nudge and the interaction between nudging and grading.
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Moving to models where I test how varying the percentage towards a student’s final grades
effects whether they attempt, in columns 3 and 4, there is no clear dose response. Problems that
were worth two to three percent towards students’ final grade made the treated about three to four
percentage points more likely to attempt a problem then when it was worth one percent. There
was no significant difference between two and three percent toward students’ final grade. This is
consistent with the common refrain that students "need every point they can get". In terms of the
model it suggests that the effects of varying λi have diminishing marginal returns on student time
input. In order to find a more effective margin for grading, I would have had to vary the worth of a
problem set to be somewhere between zero and one.
Grading a problem also meant that given an attempt, they spent about 31.4 additional minutes
on all attempts than they otherwise would have. For their additional effort, the score they received
increased by 48.8 points out of 100 maximum. By contrast, nudging a problem leads to only
3.5 more minutes spent for recommended problem sets and 2.9 additional minutes for graded
problem sets. The effect on score decreased by 2.9 points when nudged.11 This shows that ungraded
problems, even when students were told they were likely to be on the exam, were not treated nearly
as seriously as when they were graded.

1.6.3

Effects on the exam

Reduced form effects are in Table 1.4. I show the reduced form of grading on getting similar
problems correct on the exam using the same independent variables as in column 2 of Table 1.3. The
effect on grading these problems was 2.6 percentage points over a mean of 53 percent. The effect is
the same with or without student fixed effects. The effect was 1.3 percentage point on the midterm
and 4.0 percentage points on the final. Moving to instrumental variable estimation, attempting a
problem set boosted performance by 3.4 percentage points. This effect was 1.7 percentage points
11

The effect of nudging on time spent and score should be interpreted with caution since the score depends on
problem difficulty and I did not balance problem difficulty between problems that would be nudged and problems
that would not be nudged at the beginning of the semester. Since these effects are identified between students across
problem sets, differences in problem set difficulty could bias the results. The same does not apply to problem attempts
since students do not know the difficulty of a problem before attempting.
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for the midterm and 5.1 percentage points for the final.12
Coming back to the nudge intervention, it is of some interest to ask what the reduced form effects
of nudging would be if they were measurable, given the small shifts in attempting a problem set
given a nudge. For this calculation, I will assume that an attempt induced from grading is equivalent
to an attempt induced by nudging in terms of how it affects getting a problem correct on the exam.13
Using the first stage effects of nudges, and the IV estimation of the effect of attempts on getting a
problem correct on the exam I can use a simple wald-estimator.14 Multiplying 3.4 percentage points,
the effect of attempts on correct answers on the exam, by the increase in probability of attempting a
problem of 3.0 percentage points when it is nudged and ungraded, I get a reduced form estimate of
the effect of nudging of 0.1 percentage points.

1.6.4

Problem specific heterogeneity

To explore why there were different effects across exams, I turn to problem specific heterogeneity
in Figure 1.2. The figure shows the percentage correct on the exam for the problem set for which
students did not have a corresponding graded practice problem on the x-axis and the effect of
attempting the corresponding practice problem on the y-axis. There are no clear patterns regarding
difficulty of the problem and effects on the exam. While there may be some negative relationship
between the percent correct for ungraded students and the effect of attempting a practice problem,
there are outliers at the more difficult end of the distribution. I will focus on only the two problems
for which the effect of attempting that problem varied significantly from the average effect across
all questions excluding that one. This includes problem 1, for which the effect was much smaller
12

One possible explanation for the differences in the results from the midterm to the final is that students attempted
to play catch-up after the midterm and took the practice problems more seriously. There are, however, no detectable
changes in response to grading, nudging or total effort from before to after the midterm.
13
This is probably too generous to the effect of nudges as the time increase for studying is approximately 8.9 times
greater for grading than for nudging conditional on an attempt.
14
0
The wald estimator is β̂ = x̄ȳ11 −ȳ
−x̄0 where β̂ is the estimated parameter of some endogenous variable such as
attempting, the numerator on the right side is the difference between a treated group and a control group’s outcome
variable, on an outcome such as getting a problem correct on the exam and the denominator the difference between the
means of a treated and control groups endogenous variable such as attempting a problem set (Cameron and Trivedi,
2005).

CHAPTER 1. NUDGES VERSUS INCENTIVES

18

than the leave one out mean, and problem 12 for which the effect was much bigger.
Problem 1 was a question on supply shifts and total expenditure. In the practice problem students
were asked to identify a negative supply shift by description and state how that shift effected total
revenue in the market. The practice problem they were given used an elastic demand curve while
the problem on the exam used an inelastic demand curve. Students overall found the problem on
the exam to be difficult, with only 35.7 percent of the ungraded group answering it correctly. Most
students correctly answered that the supply curves shift to the left, but the plurality incorrectly
assumed that revenue declined. Having experience with an elastic demand curve made students
feel even more strongly about this incorrect assumption with regards to inelastic demand curves.
Students that attempted the practice problem because it was graded were 6.4 percentage points less
likely to get it right than those that did not attempt because it was not graded.
Problem 12 was a game theory question about the breakdown of a cartel agreement. The
setup of the problem was identical while the question asked was slightly different. Students found
this exceedingly difficult: ungraded students got the problem wrong at a rate higher than would
be predicted by random guessing. The problem is procedural and so requires a very specific
progression of logic. Students need to ask what happens when a two-party cartel drop their equal
output agreement and one party decides to expand output. The math involved is simple arithmetic,
but the logic requires multiple steps and time. Without having attempted the practice problem, it is
not surprising few were able to obtain the correct answer.

1.6.5

Student specific heterogeneity

In Table 1.5, there were some differences in response to grading or nudging a problem by baseline
characteristics on attempts. First, there appeared to be some heterogeneity by race, with Asian and
White students being a bit more responsive to grading than other race students. White students
also gained more from attempting these practice problems than Asian or other students, though
not significantly so. Second, although men and women were about equally responsive to grading,
women took the nudge more seriously. They were also more positively affected by attempting a

CHAPTER 1. NUDGES VERSUS INCENTIVES

19

problem than were men.
The biggest differential response was between those with greater than or less than the median
GPA. Those with greater than average GPA were more responsive to both grading and nudging a
problem. While both groups had large responses to grading, those with greater than a median GPA
had slightly larger responses than those with less than a median GPA. The response to nudging,
however, was almost zero for those with less than the median GPA and double the overall effect
for those with greater than the median GPA. This makes some intuitive sense recalling equation
(7). The term for exams includes the expectation that a problem will be on the exam which has a
bigger impact on S, the greater is a students time input impact on learning. For example, if a student
believes that no matter the effort they put in, it will not help them on the exam, the knowledge that a
question will be on the exam will induce no extra effort.15
Surprisingly, the split between GPA did not predict how much students learned from attempting
a problem set. In Table 1.6, the probability increase for low GPA students, 4.1 percentage points,
was greater than for high GPA students, 2.9 percentage points, but it is not a significant difference.
In addition, students with greater than median GPA spend about the same amount of time on
problem sets as students that have lower than median GPA, 39 and 36 minutes respectively. This
suggests that with equal effort, students with lower than median GPA have about the same return on
attempting a problem as high GPA students.16
I will, for illustration, estimate the effect of below median GPA students putting in equal amounts
of effort to high GPA students. I will first be conservative and assume that the differences in the
effect of attempts on GPA that were observed are due to random chance. I will assume that below
median GPA students increase the probability they get a problem correct by 3.4 percentage points,
the mean overall. I will also focus on graded problems since both types of students tend to put a lot
more effort in these problem sets than other problem sets.
15

I produce additional heterogeneous effects on alternative measures of effort in appendix D.
The response to both attempting and correctly answering problems is the same in direction when you split by
below median and above median SAT scores. Taking SAT is not a necessary requirement for getting into this college
and therefore is more missing than prior semesters’ GPA. Prior semesters’ GPA is less missing than perhaps at other
colleges, because this introductory course is mostly restricted to students after their freshman year and few students
matriculate to this college between the fall and spring semesters.
16
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For problems on the test for which above median GPA and below median GPA students had
graded practice problems, they answered these questions correctly 61.1 percent and 48.9 percent
respectively. In addition, high GPA and low GPA students attempted graded practice problems at a
rate of 92.9 percent and 77.2 percent respectively. If low GPA students practiced problems at the
same rate as high GPA students, they would decrease the gap in score by 0.5 percentage points,
3.4 × 15.6. This accounts for approximately 4.0 percent of the gap in the percent correct between
high and low GPA students.
While small, this estimate is conservative for the difference in the gap between high and low
GPA students that can be made up by increased effort. I only account for the difference in effort on
a single, albeit very related problem set. High GPA students may also exert more effort in other
class activities, such as attendance, readings, and pre-class reading quizzes.
Up until now, I’ve been assuming that the only thing that effects these 12 problems on the exam
are attempts of 12 similar problem sets. Relaxing this assumption might help explain why above
median GPA students are effected less by these experimental problems than below median GPA
students. In fact, high GPA students exert about 40 percent more total effort on online activities
outside the 12 problem sets from this experiment.
To examine how much outside knowledge may have figured into the effect of problems on the
exam see Figure 1.3. Here I show the effect of each problem for students above and below the
median GPA. One thing that is evident is that the group that gains more from these problems is not
uniformly those with less than median GPA. In fact, with confidence intervals most of the effects
would be overlapping.
We can look first at problem 12, where students that were not graded for the problem set got
the problem on the exam correct at no greater than random guessing. This implies that no prior
knowledge was available to solve this problem on the exam outside of the practice problem. Students
with higher than median and below median GPA gained about equally. Contrast these results with
problem 6. Most students got this problem correct regardless of whether it was graded or not. This
implies students that did not try this problem had much of the required knowledge anyway through
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effort elsewhere. Here, below median GPA students gained more from the problem set. These
results are consistent with less effort exertion being the cause of the gaps between below median
and above median GPA students, rather than less productive effort.

1.7

Conclusion

The nudge intervention does appear to contain some limited information that students use to organize
their efforts outside class. Nevertheless, the effect pales in comparison to simply grading a problem
set. This is not surprising given the model outlined here, since grading enters students’ signal
function directly and induces a much larger expected increase in S than the knowledge that a
problem is likely to be on the exam. The two interventions together still produce some increase in
time input and therefore teachers who want to direct additional focus on a problem, may wish to
both grade and tell students the problem is likely to be on the exam.
I also highlight the importance of needing large changes in behavior in order to evaluate medium
run outcomes. Even in an outcome as proximate as exam questions directly related to practice
questions, I was barely able to detect significant effects on exams with close to 800 unique students
across 12 problems when the first-stage effects of the randomized intervention were large. It is no
wonder experiments such as Dobronyi et al. (2019) that try to detect effects on long run outcomes
with minimal input struggle with power issues. My nudge intervention of telling students problems
would be on the exam produced only a small shift in behavior. Given the IV estimates obtained
using grading, these small shifts in behavior would yield reduced form effect sizes which would be
undetectable in most experiments.
For researchers hoping to find effects of nudges on long run outcomes with reasonable sample
sizes it requires payoffs from the information provided to be sufficiently large. Since nudges are low
cost, however, they need not create large behavioral changes in order to clear cost-benefit thresholds.
This experiment shows how an incentive-based intervention which targets the same behavior more
effectively, but at a possibly higher cost, can help us to ballpark the reduced form effects of the
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nudge.
In addition, this research shows heterogeneous effects by student GPA. There are several possible
explanations to the results that high GPA students are more responsive to grading and nudging but
have no greater gains from attempting practice problems for the exam. It could be that high GPA
and low GPA students have the same efficiency in time investment in homework. In addition, high
GPA students, who have invested more time in all aspects of a course, could be on a flatter portion
of their diminishing marginal time input curve and thus gain less from any one additional activity.
Both these explanations are consistent with the problem specific GPA splits in Figure 1.3. More
effort exerted by low GPA students could help close gaps in learning. A possible remedy to alleviate
the gap in effort could be to require more graded work to students that fail test thresholds.
This work also shows that a commonly used tool in online classes, problems with instant
feedback, can have limited success in teaching certain problems to students. It is unclear whether
students learn concepts from problem sets when key assumptions are changed. I should caution that
my results are based on a careful reading of only 12 distinct problem sets. A larger sample with
many different types of problem sets could lead to additional insights.
Finally, I show how a crossover experimental design, using grading as the intervention, can be a
powerful tool to reveal the effects of online learning activities. Since my experiment uses an online
platform, the experiment could be easily reproduced at other institutions. Other researchers could
iterate the experiment, tweaking problem sets or using different ones altogether, building a database
on effective problem sets for learning. A similar experimental setup could be used to test other
forms of online learning. For example, one popular tool is video assisted learning with breaks for
questions to illicit active attention and participation by students. This might more closely mimic the
interaction between students and teacher in the classroom and lead to more intuitive learning.
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Table 1.1: Example of identification on the effect of nudging and grading on attempting a
practice problem
Group A

Group B

Identified across
randomized
groups

Chapter 1
problem set 1

a=P(Attempt | graded
and nudged)

b=P(Attempt | rec. and
nudged)

a-b : Effect of
grading given a
nudge

Chapter 4
problem set 7

c=P(Attempt | graded
and not nudged)

d=P(Attempt | rec. and
not nudged)

c-d: Effect of
grading given no
nudge

Identified across
problem sets

a-c: Effect of a nudge
on graded problem

b-d: Effect of a nudge
on rec. problem

(a-b)-(c-d)=(a-c)(b-d)

Note: Nudge refers to telling a student a problem like those contained in their graded or recommended problem sets
is likely to be on the test. Rec. is an abbreviation for recommended. Problems that were recommended did not
count towards students grade.
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Table 1.2: Baseline characteristics of participants at the beginning and end of the semester
Beginning Sample

Prior School Performance
GPA
SAT Verbal
SAT Math
Prior School Experience
Cumulative Credits
Underclass
Attends Part Time
Demographics
Age
Female
Asian
Black,Hispanic, Other
Native English Speaker
p-value, joint χ2

Ending Sample

A

B

B-A

N

A

B

3.10
550.06
611.39

3.17
549.20
610.6

0.07*
-0.86
-0.75

812
666
676

3.14
550.71
614.86

3.24
550.66
617.40

17.70
0.85
0.04

18.51
0.83
0.03

0.81
0.02
-0.01

832
832
832

16.33
0.85
0.03

17.77
0.86
0.02

0.44
0.01
-0.01

738
738
738

20.53
0.36
0.53
0.29
0.14

20.75
0.31
0.50
0.29
0.15

0.22
-0.05
-0.03
0.00
0.01

484
701
832
832
340

20.28
0.37
0.55
0.28
0.15

20.50
0.33
0.52
0.28
0.15

-0.22
-0.04
-0.03
-0.01
0.00

436
614
738
738
285

0.176

Significance levels of differences are indicated by ∗ < .1, ** < .05, *** < .01.

0.148

B-A

N

0.10* 721
-0.05 599
-2.5 604
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Table 1.3: First stage effects of nudging, grading, and the interaction on attempts, total time spent given
attempting, and score given attempting
Attempt

Graded
Nudged
Graded×Nudged

(1)

(2)

71.8∗∗∗
(1.3)
3.0∗∗∗
(0.8)
-1.1
(1.0)

71.2∗∗∗
(1.2)

Worth 1%
Worth 2%
Worth 3%
Untreated Mean
# of Obs
# of students

12.6
9,996
833

12.6
9,996
833

(3)

Total Time
(4)

3.0∗∗∗
(0.8)
-1.1
(1.0)
69.1∗∗∗
(1.5)
73.7∗∗∗
(1.4)
72.4∗∗∗
(1.4)

68.6∗∗∗
(1.4)
73.2∗∗∗
(1.3)
71.9∗∗∗
(1.3)

12.6
9,996
833

12.6
9,996
833

Score

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

31.4∗∗∗
(1.9)
3.5∗∗
(1.8)
-0.6
(2.0)

30.6∗∗∗
(1.5)

48.8∗∗∗
(2.2)
-2.9
(2.6)
0.6
(2.6)

49.3∗∗∗
(1.8)

10.8
4,857
787

10.8
4,857
787

38.7
4,959
787

38.7
4,959
787

Note: Coefficients are estimated via OLS. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered by student. All models
include student fixed effects. Problem set instead of chapter fixed effects are included in even numbered models.
Significance levels are indicated by ∗ < .1, ** < .05, *** < .01. The worth of a problem set denotes how much
students final grade the problems were worth on the homework. They are all measured relative to problem sets
which are recommended.
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Table 1.4: Reduced form and IV effects of grading and attempting problem sets, on
answering related exam questions correctly
Reduced Form
(1) All
Graded

IV

(2) Midterm (3) Final (4) All

2.6∗∗∗

1.3

4.0∗∗∗

(1.0)

(1.4)

(1.5)

Attempted

(5) Midterm (6) Final

3.4∗∗∗

1.7

5.1∗∗∗

(1.2)

(1.7)

(1.8)

Ungraded Mean

52.8

60.4

44.9

52.8

60.4

44.9

# of Obs

9,072

4,644

4,428

9,072

4,644

4,428

785

778

738

785

778

738

# of Students

Note: Coefficients in reduced form are estimated via OLS. Coefficients in IV are estimated via 2SLS.
All models have student and problem set fixed effects. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered
by student. Significance levels are indicated by ∗ < .1, ** < .05, *** < .01.

Table 1.5: First stage effects of nudging and grading on attempts by baseline characteristics
Race

Graded
Nudged

Math SAT Score

Gender

GPA

Asian

White

Other

< Med

> Med

Miss

Female

Male

< Med

> Med

73.5∗∗∗

75.2∗∗∗

66.3∗∗∗

71.1∗∗∗

75.5∗∗∗

65.0∗∗∗

72.7∗∗∗

70.6∗∗∗

68.0∗∗∗

75.7∗∗∗

(1.7)

(2.7)

(2.3)

(1.9)

(1.8)

(3.1)

(2.3)

(1.6)

(1.8)

(1.6)

∗

∗∗∗

1.5

0.4

5.7∗∗∗

∗∗∗

2.9

2.3

1.9

(1.1)

(1.8)

(1.4)

(1.1)

(1.3)

(2.1)

(1.4)

(1.0)

(0.9)

(1.3)

-1.8

-2.8

1.3

1.5

-3.1∗∗

-2.0

-3.2∗

0.4

2.0

-4.6∗∗∗

(1.3)

(2.3)

(1.9)

(1.5)

(1.6)

(2.5)

(1.8)

(1.3)

(1.4)

(1.5)

Untreated Mean

13.5

10.1

12.5

10.7

12.2

17.5

16.1

10.2

8.2

16.9

# of Obs

5,160

1,920

2,916

4,068

4,044

1,884

2,832

5,580

4,896

4,848

430

160

243

339

337

157

236

465

408

404

Graded×Nudged

# of students

3.5

4.1

2.9

∗∗∗

5.2

Note: Coefficients are estimated via OLS. All specifications are clustered by student. All models have student and chapter fixed effects.
Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered by student. Significance levels are indicated by ∗ < .1, ** < .05, *** < .01. Miss refers to
the SAT score being missing for that group, and Med refers to median.
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Table 1.6: IV effects of attempting problem sets on answering related exam questions correctly by baseline characteristics
Race

Math SAT Score
Other < Med > Med

Female

Male

< Med

> Med

4.7∗∗∗

-4.2

5.2∗∗

2.5

4.1∗∗

2.9∗

(2.0)

(1.8)

(3.2)

(2.4)

(1.6)

(1.8)

(1.7)

54.3

46.8

57.9

54.7

54.6

50.3

45.7

53.5

1,712

2,588

3,644

3,764

1,664

2,636

4,940

4,228

4,628

149

226

315

325

145

226

432

373

393

White

2.9∗

7.2∗∗∗

1.5

5.2∗∗

(1.7)

(2.8)

(2.5)

Untreated Mean

54.7

53.0

# of Obs

4,772
410

# of students

GPA

Miss

Asian
Attempted

Gender

Note: Coefficients are estimated via 2SLS. All specifications are clustered by student. All models have student and problem set
fixed effects. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered by student. Significance levels are indicated by ∗ < .1, ** < .05,
*** < .01. Miss refers to the SAT score being missing for that group, and Med refers to median.
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Intro Micro
Enrollees
N=833
Choose class

Classes 1 to 8
Randomized
within class
Syllabus
Group A
N=423
N=416

N=7

Syllabus
Group B
N=410
N=7

N=403

Enrolled
Online Group
A N=423

Enrolled
Online Group
B N=410

Group A
Midterm
Enrolled
N=393

Group B
Midterm
Enrolled
N=385

Group A
Final Enrolled
N=376

Group B
Final Enrolled
N=362

Figure 1.1: Experimental Flowchart
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Effect of Attempt on Percent Correct

0.25
0.2
12

0.15

9

0.1

2

Mean=0.034

0.05

7

10

0

4

3
5
11

6

8

-0.05

1

-0.1
-0.15
-0.2

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

Percent Correct of Exam Problem for Ungraded
Midterm

Final

Figure 1.2: Problem Specific Effects and confidence intervals by Mean on Exam

Effect of Attempt on Percent Correct
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0.25
0.2
12

0.15

7

9

0.1

2

1

0.05

5 11
4

8

Mean=0.034

6

3

10

0
-0.05
-0.1
-0.15
-0.2

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

Percent Correct of Exam Problem for Ungraded
Above Median GPA

Below Median GPA

Figure 1.3: Problem specific effects by ungraded mean on exam and GPA
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Appendix A Waiver of consent

During the IRB process, I sought for and received a waiver of consent. These are the conditions
any study needs to meet in order to obtain this waiver. It must involve no more than minimal risk
to subjects. The research could not be carried out practicably without the waiver. The waiver or
alteration will not adversely affect the rights and welfare of the subjects. Finally, the subjects will
be provided with additional information about their participation if the research involves deceptive
practices.
This research involved no more than minimal risk to subjects since they would have been
required to complete the same amount of work for a grade and received the same number of
recommended problems if the research was not conducted. Care was taken to ensure that students
received the same level of difficulty in problems on average.17 . In addition the treatment effects
of assignment to A or B on answering the set of 12 questions correctly was very close to zero and
insignificant.
It could not be carried out practicably without the waiver because informing subjects about their
participation in the study would have put the stable unit treatment value assumption at greater risk
of being violated. The reason is that subjects might have become aware of their assignment by
talking to one another, and so have been more likely to complete problems that were graded for the
opposite group.
The rights and welfare of subjects were not impeded because both groups received the same
treatment on different problems with similar levels of difficulty. Their selection into either group
was therefore equitable since both groups selection was equitable. My assessments of risk at the
midterm and final revealed no differential impacts on group A and group B on their test scores, nor at
the end of the semester on their final grades. In Table 1.7 you can see all assessed outcome variables
and that they are not significant by assignment group. Further, the privacy and confidentiality of
subjects was maintained by creating a test score key which we could link to their online work output
17
Indeed the ungraded exam means for sets of problems by groups were not significantly or practicably different
from one another, with 53.2% correct corresponding problems for group A and 52.2% correct corresponding problems
for group B
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Table 1.7: Effect of assignment to group B on attempting, time on first attempt, total time
spent, score given attempting, and correct answer on exam
Attempt

# of Attempts

Time on 1st

Total Time

Score

Correct on Exam

Group B

1.6
(1.4)

-0.1
(0.1)

-0.8
(1.4)

-1.6
(1.6)

2.2
(2.4)

1.0
(1.3)

Untreated Mean
# of Obs
# of Students

12.6
9,996
833

1.4
4,664
833

8.7
4,857
787

10.8
4,857
787

38.7
4,959
787

60.6
9,846
785

Note: Coefficients are estimated via OLS. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered by student. All models have student
fixed effects. Significance levels are indicated by ∗ < .1, ** < .05, *** < .01.

and characteristics using a secure encrypted folder on a computer not connected to the internet and
than discard identifiable information for further analysis.
Finally, the research was in no way deceptive because their syllabus contained the following
statement in italics. "Please note that in some post-lecture quizzes we give different questions of
equal difficulty to different students. We vary the questions so that students see a range of problems."
This informed the students that they would receive different questions without revealing that they
were involved in an experiment. I therefore am under no obligation to give further information to
the students involved in the experiment.

1.9

Appendix B Treatments by group and problem set

Table 1.8 shows the intended treatment. There were two exceptions to this plan. For experimental
chapter 5, there was a snow day and the professor changed their schedule without informing the
course administrator before doing so. The scheduled problem set for this chapter occurred earlier
then was intended and no nudge was sent for this chapter as a result.
Second due to a simple coding error on my part, another class had its nudges flipped in the
last two chapters of the semester, with group A getting nudged for their recommended problem
and group B getting nudged for their graded problem. In chapter 6, group A was nudged for their
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Table 1.8: Interventions by problem set and group
Chapter/Problem Set

Group A Treatment

Group B Treatment

Chapter 1 Problem Set 1
Chapter 1 Problem Set 2
Chapter 2 Problem Set 3
Chapter 2 Problem Set 4
Chapter 3 Problem Set 5
Chapter 3 Problem Set 6
Chapter 4 Problem Set 7
Chapter 4 Problem Set 8
Chapter 5 Problem Set 9
Chapter 5 Problem Set 10
Chapter 6 Problem Set 11
Chapter 6 Problem Set 12

Graded(1%)/Nudged
Recommended/Not Nudged
Graded(2%)/Not Nudged
Recommended/ Nudged
Graded(3%)/Nudged
Recommended/Not Nudged
Graded(1%)/Not Nudged
Recommended/ Nudged
Graded(2%)/Nudged
Recommended/Not Nudged
Graded(3%)/Not Nudged
Recommended/ Nudged

Recommended/Nudged
Graded(1%)/Not Nudged
Recommended/Not Nudged
Graded(2%)/Nudged
Recommended/Nudged
Graded(3%)/Not Nudged
Recommended/Not Nudged
Graded(1%)/Nudged
Recommended/Nudged
Graded(2%)/Not Nudged
Recommended/Not Nudged
Graded(3%)/Nudged

Note: Nudged refers to telling a student a problem like their graded or recommended problem set is likely to be on
the test. The 1%, 2%, and 3% indicate the percent towards final grade a graded problem is worth.

recommended problem set and group B was nudged for their graded problem set. It should be
noted however, that neither of these mishaps led to any detectable harm, as the effort response
from nudges was small, and the difference between graded and recommended problem nudges even
smaller. Re-running the results without these classes included does not alter the results in any table
or figure in any substantial way.
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Appendix C Test questions related to experiment

Figure: Kilowatt Hours
12

Sm

10

Sn

8

Price per Kilowatt Hours

1.10

34

6
4
2

Demand

0
0

2

4 of Kilowatt
6 Hours
Quantity

8

10

1. Pictured in the figure above are the supply and demand curves for in home
energy. Due to activist worries, the government decides to ban nuclear power as
a means of energy production, causing the supply curve to shift along an inelastic
demand curve. Which way does the supply curve shift? What effect does this
change have on total energy expenditure?
a.
b.
c.
d.

Right, increases
Right, decreases
Left, increases
Left, decreases

2. The quantity of grape juice sold rose while the price remained the same. Which
of the following are plausible explanations?
a.
b.
c.
d.

Supply increased, and the demand was unit elastic
Supply increased, and demand was perfectly inelastic
Supply increased, and demand decreased
Supply increased and demand was perfectly elastic
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3. Assume the following demand, 𝑄 = 240 − 4𝑃 and supply equation, 𝑄 = 4𝑃.
Suppose the government taxes consumers T dollars such that the new demand
equation is 𝑄 = 240 − 4(𝑃 + 𝑇). What are the new equilibrium price and
quantities?
a.
b.
c.
d.

P= 30-T and Q = 120-2T
P= 30-1/2T and Q = 120-2T
P= 120+T and Q= 30 +T
P= 120-T and Q = 30-T

Figure: Fine Wine & Yankees Tickets
Price of Fine Wine

Price of Yankees Tickets

Quantity of Fine Wine

Quantity of Yankees Tickets

4. Refer to the figure above. Suppose the government imposes a $30 tax on both
fine wine and Yankees tickets. Tax revenue (TR) will be ______ and dead weight
loss (DWL) _______.
a.
b.
c.
d.

lower, lower in the market for fine wine
higher, higher in the market for fine wine
higher, lower in the market for Yankee tickets
lower, higher in the market for Yankee tickets
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Figure: Avocados
Price ($)

Quantity
(bushels)
5. The figure above shows the domestic supply and demand for avocados in the
US. Suppose that the world price for avocados is $30 a bushel. The Trump
administration wants to impose an import tariff of $10 per bushel. As a result of
the tariff, the change in consumer surplus (CS) and producer surplus (PS) are…
a.
b.
c.
d.

CS falls by $200;
CS falls by $325;
CS falls by $100;
CS falls by $250;

PS rises by $200
PS rises by $175
PS also falls by $100
PS rises by $400
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Figure: Smartphones

6. The figure above shows the supply and demand curves for smartphones
produced and consumed in the US, as well as the world price for smartphones. A
labor strike at a foreign production facility slows the production of smartphones
overseas. What happens to the world price for smartphones? Who will be made
better off?
a.
b.
c.
d.

Rise; US producers of smartphones
Rise; US consumers of smartphones
Fall; Foreign Producers
Fall; US consumers of smartphones
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Figure 2

7. Refer to figure 2. In the year 2035 TechX discovers a way to mine rare earth
metals from asteroids in close proximity to earth at virtually no cost. These
rare earth metals are used in manufacturing solar panels. TechX is the only
company with rockets this advanced and no company will be able to
duplicate this for a long time. The following graph shows the marginal cost
curve (MC1) and Average Total Cost Curve (ATC1) for everyone else in the
short run and the marginal cost curve (MC2) and Average Total Cost Curve
(ATC2) for TechX to produce Solar Panels. What happens to profits/losses
for solar panel sale in the short run and the long run?
a. TechX takes Economic Losses; TechX makes Economic Profit
b. TechX makes Economic Profit; TechX takes Economic Losses
c. TechX makes Economic Profit; TechX makes zero profit
d. TechX makes zero profit; TechX makes Economic Profit

38
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8. Suppose that each firm in a competitive industry has the following cost
curves:
Total cost: TC = 32 + ½ Q2; where Q is the individual firm’s quantity
produced. MC=Q. Assume the market price is $14 per unit. If the market
price falls, how much will each firm produce in the long run?
a. 32
b. 8
c. 11
d. 64
Scenario 1
A company is considering building a bridge across a river. The company would have
monopoly control over the revenue and profit. The bridge would cost $1 million to
build and nothing to maintain. The following table shows the company’s anticipated
demand over the lifetime of the bridge:

Price
(Dollars per crossing)
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0

Quantity
(Thousands of crossings)
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400

9. Refer to Scenario 1. If the company declined to build the bridge, should the
government build it?
a. Yes because the efficient number of crossings is 200
b. No, because like the company, it would lose money
c. Yes, because total surplus to society exceeds the costs
d. No, because even where price equals marginal cost, the government
would lose money

39
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Scenario 2: Consider a monopolist with the following cost and demand curve.
Concerned about high prices the government breaks up the monopolist and
makes the industry competitive.
Demand:

P=19−Q

Total Cost:

TC=1+Q+0.5Q2

Marginal Cost:

MC=1+Q

10.Refer to Scenario 2: What is the deadweight loss associated with the
monopolist?
a. $36
b. $45
c. $9
d. $27
Scenario 6: Pete’s is a small coffee company that is considering
entering a market dominated by Starbucks. Each company’s
profit depends on whether Pete’s enters and whether Starbucks
sets a high price or a low price:
Starbucks

Pete’s

High Price

Low Price

Enter

$0.5 million, $3 million

$2 million, $2 million

Don’t
Enter

$1 million, $4 million

$0, $2.5 million

11.Refer to Scenario 6: Which of the following best describes the likely
equilibrium if any.
a. Starbucks charges a low price and Pete’s enters the market
b. A dominant strategy that results in a Nash equilibrium is for
Starbucks to charge a high price and for Pete’s to enter the market
c. The Nash equilibrium is for Pete’s not to enter and for Starbucks to
charge a high price
d. There is no Nash equilibrium
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Scenario 7: Consider a town in which only two companies, Agua and Eau, own wells
that produce bottled water. Agua and Eau can pump and sell as much water as they
want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows
the town's demand schedule for water.

Price
(Dollars per gallon)

Quantity Demanded
(Gallons of water)

Total Revenue
(Dollars)

10

0

0

9

30

$270.00

8

60

$480.00

7

90

$630.00

6

120

$720.00

5

150

$750.00

4

180

$720.00

3

210

$630.00

2

240

$480.00

370

$370.00

1

12.Refer to Scenario 7: Agua and Eau have colluded for years to maximize
profits. Agua’s new ownership decides to break that arrangement and
produce more bottled water. How low will the price fall as the two firms
compete on output?
a. $1
b. $2
c. $3
d. $4
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Table 1.9: Differences between online practice problems and test questions
Chapter/Problem Set

Change

Effect Size

Chapter 1 Problem Set 1

Switched inelastic supply curve with elastic supply curve
Made quantity rise instead of stay same and price
stay same instead of falling
Same Setup
Same Setup
Asked to compute exact change of consumer
surplus and producer surplus
Adverse rather than positive supply shifting
event
Same setup
Skips lead up steps
Same Setup
Asks about deadweight loss
Same Setup
Asks for price instead of optimal output

-0.06

Chapter 1 Problem Set 2
Chapter 2 Problem Set 3
Chapter 2 Problem Set 4
Chapter 3 Problem Set 5
Chapter 3 Problem Set 6
Chapter 4 Problem Set 7
Chapter 4 Problem Set 8
Chapter 5 Problem Set 9
Chapter 5 Problem Set 10
Chapter 6 Problem Set 11
Chapter 6 Problem Set 12

1.11

0.07
0.04
0.01
0.03
0.01
0.05
-0.03
0.10
0.01
0.02
0.16

Appendix D Heterogeneous effects for alternative measures
of effort

In this section you can see how grading, and nudging effected the alternative measures of effort
given attempting by student baseline characteristics as shown in Table 1.3, columns 3-10. As a
note of caution, especially for the nudging variables, the effects might be contaminated by problem
specific difficulty as I did not balance across nudged and not nudged problems on difficulty.
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Table 1.10: First stage effects of nudging and grading on total time on all attempts given attempting by baseline
characteristics
Race

Graded
Nudged
Graded×Nudged

Untreated Mean
# of Obs
# of students

Math SAT Score

Gender

GPA

Asian

White

Other

< Med

> Med

Miss

Female

Male

< Med

> Med

30.8∗∗∗

27.7∗∗∗

34.5∗∗∗

32.3∗∗∗

26.4∗∗∗

39.0∗∗∗

34.2∗∗∗

28.2∗∗∗

30.3∗∗∗

31.3∗∗∗

(2.1)

(2.6)

(4.1)

(3.6)

(1.9)

(3.6)

(2.7)

(2.8)

(2.9)

(2.2)

6.7

∗∗∗

-1.3

-0.9

5.1∗∗

∗∗

5.0

12.0

∗∗∗

2.4

0.7

-0.1

1.1

(2.2)

(3.0)

(3.4)

(3.0)

(2.3)

(3.0)

(2.6)

(2.6)

(2.7)

(2.1)

-1.7

2.3

0.3

2.9

3.8

-13.5∗∗∗

-2.7

3.5

1.7

-0.7

(2.4)

(3.4)

(3.9)

(3.4)

(2.6)

(3.5)

(3.0)

(2.9)

(2.9)

(2.4)

9.7

13.2

11.7

12.0

10.7

9.4

10.2

11.1

8.7

11.9

2,612

911

1,334

1,883

2,035

939

1,512

2,524

2,051

2,687

410

151

226

322

322

143

229

430

370

398

Note: Coefficients are estimated via OLS. All specifications are clustered by student. All models have student level fixed effects. Standard
errors in parenthesis are clustered by student. Significance levels are indicated by ∗ < .1, ** < .05, *** < .01. Miss refers to the SAT score
being missing for that group, and Med refers to median.
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Table 1.11: First stage effects of nudging and grading on score given attempting by baseline characteristics
Race

Math SAT Score

Gender

GPA

Asian

White

Other

< Med

> Med

Miss

Female

Male

< Med

> Med

48.2∗∗∗

53.1∗∗∗

47.8∗∗∗

52.2∗∗∗

47.6∗∗∗

45.4∗∗∗

41.6∗∗∗

53.8∗∗∗

53.9∗∗∗

46.8∗∗∗

(2.8)

(5.3)

(3.8)

(3.4)

(3.6)

(3.5)

(3.5)

(2.8)

(3.3)

(2.6)

-4.4

8.9∗

-6.2

-3.7

-7.1∗

5.1

-9.4∗∗

0.0

-3.9

-3.1

(3.2)

(5.3)

(4.3)

(3.8)

(3.8)

(4.5)

(3.9)

(3.6)

(3.6)

(3.0)

2.4

-11.0∗∗

3.4

0.3

5.8

-7.1

7.2∗

-2.0

0.9

1.2

(3.2)

(5.4)

(4.4)

(3.9)

(3.8)

(4.7)

(3.9)

(3.7)

(3.8)

(3.0)

Untreated Mean

39.9

37.7

36.9

32.3

43.8

39.3

47.1

30.8

28.2

43.3

# of Obs

2,658

931

1,370

1,933

2,067

959

1,535

2,584

2,093

2,744

410

151

226

322

322

143

229

430

370

398

Graded
Nudged
Graded×Nudged

# of students

Note: Coefficients are estimated via OLS. All specifications are clustered by student. All models have student level fixed effects. Standard
errors in parenthesis are clustered by student. Significance levels are indicated by ∗ < .1, ** < .05, *** < .01. Miss refers to the SAT score
being missing for that group, and Med refers to median.

Chapter 2
An experiment to curb online cheating in
higher education
Authors: Daniel Dench (CUNY), Theodore Joyce (CUNY)

2.1

Introduction

Online college courses and degrees programs have expanded dramatically over the past ten year.
This growth heightened long-standing concerns about cheating and plagiarism given the ease with
which material can be acquired and shared electronically. But there is also software that screens
assignments for plagiarism which increases the probability of detection. Whether the net result is
an increase in cheating is not well-known (Watson and Sottile, 2010).
In this study we use experimental methods to ascertain the extent of cheating and assess efforts
to deter it. The setting is a large public university in which undergraduates have to complete a
learning module to develop their facility with Microsoft’s Excel. The software requires students
to download a file, build a specific spreadsheet, and upload the file back into the software. The
programs grades and annotates their errors. Students can correct their mistakes and resubmit the
assignment two more times. Students have to complete between 3 to 4 projects over the course
of the semester depending on the course. Unbeknownst to the students, the software imbeds an
45
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identify code into the spreadsheet. If students use another student’s spreadsheet, but upload it under
their name, the software will indicate to the instructor that the spreadsheet has been copied and
identify both the lender and user of the plagiarized spreadsheet. Even if a student copies just part of
another student’s spreadsheet, the software will flag the spreadsheet as not the student’s own work.
The syllabus for the module includes an explicit statement that students should do their own
work along with a reminder of the importance of Excel skills in the job market. The module also
states that the software can detect whether students have used the work of another and those found
cheating will be reported to the Dean. Despite the exhortation and explicit warning regarding
detection, copied projects rose from 9.9 percent in the fall of 2017 to 14.9 percent in fall of 2018.
None of the students who copied from others were reported to the Dean. The pattern raises several
questions. First it is unclear how the many students read the syllabus module that was added to the
main syllabus for the course or how many read the specific section of the module’s syllabus entitled:
“Academic Integrity.” Second, is the rising rate of cheating over the course of the semester due to a
lack of sanctions or is it both a lack of awareness that cheating can be detected combined with the
lack of sanctions?
To address these questions we randomly divided student in each of the five classes into groups
A and B (n = 3, 580). Students were unaware which group they were in. One week before the first
assignment was due, we sent an email to group A reminding students to submit their own work
and that the software could identify both the sender and the user of the plagiarized material. The
email further stated that those caught cheating on the first assignment would be put on a watch list
for subsequent assignments. Further violations would involve their course instructor and result in
sanctions. Group B received the same email one week before the second assignment. All students
flagged for cheating in either of the two assignments were sent an email informing them that they
were currently on a watch list for rest of the semester’s assignments. Any further evidence of
cheating would be sent to the instructor of the course for further action.
We found that warning students about detection capabilities has no effect on cheating rates.
What is effective, however, is identifying and sanctioning cheaters, reducing subsequent cheating
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by 4/5’s. It not only lessens cheating for those sanctioned but lessens cheating for others in the
sanctioned class as expectations about punishment rise.
Our study contributes to the literature on cheating among college students in several novel ways.
First, we ascertain the extent of cheating with software. Most early reports of college cheating are
based on student surveys and with a few exceptions, are limited to a single institution or course.
The extent of self-reported cheating of any kind is as high as 82 percent (Bowers, 1964; McCabe
and Trevino, 1997; McCabe et al., 2001b). Specific forms of cheating such as submitting another
student’s report as one’s own is as low as three percent (Karlins et al., 1988). More recent studies of
cheating in the age of the internet have used proprietary software such as Turnitin.com to evaluate
the originality of student’s written assignments (Ledwith and Rísquez, 2008; Walker, 2010; Dee
and Jacob, 2012). Turnitin provides a similarity score. Researchers present scales of similarity or
they create a binary indicator of plagiarism based on a specific threshold of similarity after careful
screening for false positives (Dee and Jacob, 2012). However, Turnitin and similar software cannot
readily detect contract cheating in which students pay others to do their work or purchase work
from sources not in databases accessible by Turnitin (Rogerson, 2017).
Our study is novel in that we evaluate Excel spreadsheets instead of writing assignments. Any
part of the spreadsheet that comes from another source is flagged by the software. Thus, there is no
discretion as to the determination of cheating. Moreover, the system is largely, but not completely
closed, as there is unlikely to be any relevant material on the internet specific to these projects that
students could enter as their own. Students use Google for help with Excel, but that is entirely part
of the learning process. A disadvantage is that the software must identity both the sender and user
for us to flag the student for cheating. There are cases in which there is material in the spreadsheet
from an unidentified source. In this case we assume no cheating which may be a false negative.
A second contribution is that we can test whether students who are informed that they used
another student’s work on their first assignment, are less likely to do so on subsequent assignments.
Two studies using Turnitin across multiple assignments found that students whose first assignment
was flagged for similarity to material from other sources, reduced their plagiarism (Ledwith and
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Rísquez, 2008; Walker, 2010). However, as noted before, Turnitin generates a similarity score.
Thus a reduction in plagiarism could mean a student whose first assignments matched 80-100
percent of the text from another source, but whose second assignment matched 35 percent of the
text from another source could be classified as having reduced their cheating. In our study there
is less ambiguity. Students who use all or any other part of another student’s spreadsheet in their
first assignment are warned of more serious sanctions if cheating is detected on the subsequent
assignment. The first email is, thus, informational and is devoid of any explicit sanction. We are
testing whether making students more aware that we can detect cheating is a deterrent. Once flagged
for cheating, the second email informs them that the detection system is real and puts them at risk
for sanctions should the behavior continue. Third, we are testing whether repeated reminders of our
ability to detect plagiarism diminishes the rate of cheating over the course of the semester.
A third advance of our study is use of experimental methods with very large samples. Most
studies of student cheating have relied on surveys of students (McCabe et al., 2001a; Teixeira and
Rocha, 2010; Watson and Sottile, 2010; Power, 2009). Others have described the characteristics
of students that plagiarize using software such as Turnitin (Walker, 2010). Another set of studies
have compared student performance on exams in proctored or un-proctored settings (Harmon and
Lambrinos, 2008; Hollister and Berenson, 2009; Hylton et al., 2016). In one study the authors
randomly assigned 380 students in an online class to an exam proctored by a webcam (N=186) and
the other half to un-proctored exam (N=186). There was no difference in students’ scores on the
exams between the treatment and control group (Hylton et al., 2016).
In the most impressive study of plagiarism to date, authors analyzed the writing assignment of
573 students and 1,256 writing assignments for plagiarism using the software Turnitin (Dee and
Jacob, 2012). The setting was a select post-secondary institution. The research question was whether
improving students understanding of plagiarism and how to avoid it could lessen its prevalence. The
treatment consisted of a mandated online tutorial on plagiarism administered at the beginning of
the class. The authors found that 3.3 percent of students’ assignments in the control group were
plagiarized but only one percent of assignments in the treatment group. Students in the lower
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end of the SAT distribution were much more likely to plagiarize their assignment, but the tutorial
caused a much larger reduction in cheating among this subset. Based on the post-class survey, the
authors concluded that the tutorial was effective because it educated students as to what constituted
plagiarism rather than increasing their perceived risk of being be caught. Our study is different from
Dee and Jacobs in that we focus on two aspects of deterrence: the probability that one might be
flagged for cheating and an explicit sanction if caught a second time.

2.2

Conceptual Motivation

We start with the assumption that learning Excel adds to a students’ human capital (K) with direct
market returns (w). Following (Dee and Jacob, 2012), success is a function of how much effort
(E) students exert and their ability (A). Students must balance their effort on assignments against
the opportunity cost of not putting the time and effort elsewhere, c(E,A). Students perceive some
probability of being caught cheating, π, the consequences of which are S. The less effort they apply
to the assignments, the more likely they are to cheat. Thus,
likelihood of being flagged for cheating meaning

δI
δI

δπ
δE

< 0. Let I be information about the

>0. Student’s chose a level of E to maximize

their objective function:

U = wK(E, A) − c(E, A) − π(E, I)S

(2.1)

Our experiment manipulates I and S with the goal of deterring cheating. Unlike (Dee and Jacob,
2012) we assume that students know that sharing their work constitutes cheating. As Dee and Jacob
(2012) note students are less knowledgeable as to what constitutes plagiarism in writing assignments.
Paraphrasing text from an external source without citation is arguably more ambiguous than asking
a fellow student if you can copy her assignment and submit it as your own.
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The Experiment

2.3.1

Software and Setup

The setting was a large public urban university in the spring of 2019. Students from four introductory
classes in business, two in Accountancy, one in Finance and one in Management, were included
in the study. Each course has multiple sections with an average of 1000 students per course and
roughly 80 students per section. Exceptions include two large online sections in two Accountancy
courses.
Students in each course were required to build 3 to 4 Excel spreadsheets from detailed instructions that were generated from Cenage’s proprietary software. Students were required to build from
2 to 4 Excel spreadsheets in each of the their 4 pre-business courses using propriety software from
Cengage. Each student had a password-protected account with the software. For each assignment
students downloaded the shell of the spreadsheet they had to build along with the requisite data and
step-by-step instructions. They also downloaded a picture of what the finished spreadsheet should
look like. The software assigned a name to the spreadsheet shell they such as “npp.John.Doe.xlxs”.
There were 14 different assignments distributed across the four courses. In no twoe classes were
the assignments the same. Each assignment emphasized various skills with Excel from formatting,
to plotting, to pivot tables and basic macros. Each assignment had a specific due date that varies by
course. Students could upload their completed spreadsheet to their account any time before the due
date. The software graded the submission and provided detailed annotation for each error. Student
could correct the errors and re-submit the assignment. Students could submit the spreadsheet for
grading three times. Once their assignment was at least 80 percent correct, they were awarded full
credit.
Assignments submitted after the due date are penalized one percentage point for each day past
the due date. Nevertheless, students could still receive full credit if their final score was at lest 80
percent after deducting points for lateness.
We administered the Excel module independently of the class the student attended. Faculty
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assigned between 5 to 8 percent of their course grade to the completion of the Excel assignments.
At the end of the semester, we send each faculty the students’ scores on the assigments. If a student
completed none of the Excel assignments they lost at least half a grade for their course. Given
grade competition, this provided a strong incentive to submit the assignments. Of the 3,578 students
enrolled in the 4 pre-business classes, 3,006 enrolled in Excel module and 2,566 or 80% completed
all assignments.

2.3.2

Identification of Plagiarism

The software embedded a unique code in the worksheet shell as soon as a student downloaded
it. The code was hidden from students and linked to their account. Students could rename the
spreadsheet, but the identifying code remained. The code enabled us to identify any part of a
student’s spreadsheet that came from another source.
If, for example, a student uploaded another student’s spreadsheet or copied any part of another
student’s spreadsheet, the software flagged the spreadsheet as suspicious. We classified an assignment as plagiarized only if we could identify the student who shared his/her work along with the
student who used it. We could only identify the “sharer” if they were also registered with the
software. If however, the student opened another spreadsheet in order to practice or build parts of
the assignment and then copied that portion into the spreadsheet with the embedded code, then the
software also would flag the graded spreadsheet as suspicious. Similarly, if a student sought help
from someone not in the system, and if they copied work from this external person’s spreadsheet
into their own, or if they paid an external person to build the assigned spreadsheet for them but attach
his/her name to this externally constructed spreadsheet, then we could not characterize the work
as plagiarized. In other words, we only classified assignments as plagiarized if we could identify
the sharer. We did not consider this a major source of misclassification because the proportion of
suspicious spreadsheets was only 9% of clearly plagiarized submissions.
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Baseline information

We created a standard insert to each Professor’s syllabus that explained the Excel module. The insert
explained how to register for the Excel module, the grading system, the availability of tutoring and
walk-in workshops for Excel as well as an explicit warning regarding the software’s ability to detect
cheating under the heading "Academic Integrity." The text of the insert is as follows:
Academic Integrity. SAM detects files shared with other students and generates a
report for the instructors with the names of plagiarizing students and all parties involved.
Students caught cheating will be put on a watch list pending further action with their
Professor.
In addition to the course syllabus, we also created a course on the learning management system,
Blackboard, called title for example "Spring Excel Module for Finance". We posted the syllabus
insert on this Blackboard course as well. We used this Excel Blackboard course to send all emails
to students regarding the Excel module. Thus, from the beginning of the semester all students
had access to information regarding the software’s ability to detect plagiarism and the likely
consequences if caught.

2.3.4

First treatment: reminder that plagiarism can be detected

Within each course we randomly assigned students to group A or B. Group A received the warning
for the first project via the Excel Blackboard course; Group B, therefore, served as the control group
for Group A in the first assignment. The script was designed to remind/inform students that the
software could detect cheating with explicit sanctions left vague.
Your next Excel assignment is due next week. As noted on the syllabus, students are
expected to do their own work. The SAM system will detect any portion of your project
that has been copied from another SAM user. It will also identity the person from
whom you copied. Students found using others’ work or sharing their own will be put
on a watch list pending further action with their course instructor.
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The goal is to have you become more proficient in Excel, which is an essential skill in
today’s workplace. Using another student’s work is plagiarism and detrimental to your
professional development.
The Excelhelp Team
For the second Excel assignment in each course, Group B, and not Group A, was sent the email
above. In this phase, we compared the effect of being warned recently in group B to the effect of
having been warned earlier in the semester in group A. We expected any effect of the reminder on
plagiarism to be less because Group A, the control group, had already been warned prior to the first
assignment.
Figure 1 provides a schematic of the research design. We show the number of participants from
the Finance class. These students were the first to receive the reminder of our ability to detect
plagiarism and the consequences if caught. As we describe in more detail below this experiment
was the least likely to be contaminated by spillover effects.

2.3.5

Treatment 2: the threat of sanctions

After both groups A and B had completed the first two assignments, we sent an email to all student
who have used other students’ work as well as to students who shared their work.). We informed
these students in an email that according to the software they were flagged for having used another
students’s work or having shared their work with other students. We informed them that they were
now on a watch list. Any further incidence of plagiarism in the third or fourth assignments would
result in the notification of their cheating to their professor for disciplinary actions. The script was
as follows:
Dear SAM Excel User,
As noted in our previous email to you, the SAM system can detect any portion of your
project that has been copied from or shared with another SAM user. The system has
flagged one of your assignments as having been copied from or shared with another
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student. This is a serious violation of academic integrity. Your name has been put on
a watch list. Any further evidence of copying or sharing your SAM Excel projects
in subsequent assignments will result in notification to your Professor for further
disciplinary actions.
The goal is have you become more proficient in Excel, which is an essential skill in
today’s workplace. Using another student’s work or sharing your work with other
students is plagiarism and can have serious consequences for your academic standing
and is detrimental to your professional development.
This stern warning with its threat of a section sanction was not randomly assigned but send to
all students flagged for plagiarism.

2.3.6

Additional Warnings

As noted above, cheating increased with each project during the semester in 2017 and 2018. To
see if we could stem that trend, we sent a second series of warnings prior to the due dates of the
third and fourth assignments but only in the classes that assigned four projects. (see Figure 1). The
warning was the same as had been sent prior to their first or second project depending on whether
they were in group A or B. The objective was to test whether additional warnings lessened the
plagiarism on these later projects. For three project classes either no warning was sent prior to the
last assignment (MGT1) or a warnign was sent to everyone (ACC2).
We anticipated that knowledge that some students had been put on a watch lsit may have
circulated. We offer an indirect test of these possible network effects.

2.3.7

Data

Each assignment emphasizes various skills with Excel from formatting, to plotting, to pivot tables
and basic marcos. When students believe they have completed the assignment they upload the
spreadsheet to the software which corrects and annotates their errors. Students need to obtain 80

CHAPTER 2. CURB ONLINE CHEATING

55

out of 100 points in order to receive full credit for the assignment. If their score is below 80 they
are allowed two more attempts to correct their errors and resubmit their spreadsheet.
The Excel module is run independently of the class the student is taking and is overseen by
faculty and graduate students from a center for teaching and learning. Depending on the class,
the assignments account for 5 to 8 percent of the course grade. If a student completes none of
the assigned spreadsheets they lose at least half a grade for their course. Of the 3,578 students
enrolled in the 4 pre-business classes, 3,006 enrolled in Excel module and 2,566 or 80% complete
all assignments.
Each of the 5 course had multiple sections. Two course had large online sections of over 700
students whereas the other three courses had classes of approximately 80 students each and roughly
15 sections. Students could be in more than one of the five courses. We created a standard insert that
explained the Excel module that faculty included with their course syllabus. The insert explained
how to register for the Excel module, the grading system, the availability of tutoring and walk-in
workshops for Excel as well as an explicit warning regarding the software’s(SAM) ability to detect
cheating under the heading "Academic Integrity." The text of the insert is as follows:
Academic Integrity. SAM detects files shared with other students and generates a
report for the instructors with the names of plagiarizing students and all parties involved.
Students caught cheating will be put on a watch list pending further action with their
Professor.
In addition to the course syllabus, we also created a course on the learning management system,
Blackboard, called Excel Finance or Excel Management depending on the topic of the course. We
posted the syllabus insert on this Blackboard course as well. We used this Excel Blackboard course
to send all emails to students regarding the Excel module.
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First Treatment: Probability of Detection

Within each course we randomly assigned students to group A or B. Group A received the warning
for the first project via the Excel Blackboard course; Group B, therefore, served as the control group
for Group A in the first assignment. The script was designed to remind/inform students that the
software could detect cheating with explicit sanctions left vague.
Dear SAM Excel Users, Your next Excel assignment is due next week. As noted
on the syllabus, students are expected to do their own work. The SAM system will
detect any portion of your project that has been copied from another SAM user. It will
also identity the person from whom you copied. Students found using others’ work or
sharing their own will be put on a watch list pending further action with their course
instructor.
The goal is have you become more proficient in Excel, which is an essential skill in
today’s workplace. Using another student’s work is plagiarism and detrimental to your
professional development.
The Excelhelp Team
For the second Excel assignment in each course, Group B, and not Group A, was sent the email
above. In this phase, we compared the effect of being warned recently in group B to the effect of
having been warned earlier in the semester in group A. We expected less of an effect of the second
warning because Group A had already been warned and may have responded by less cheating.

2.3.9

Second Treatment: Sanctions

In the second part of the study we sent an email to any student in either Group A or B who had
been flagged for cheating on either the first or second assignment. This email informed students
that according to the software, they had shared their assignment or has used all or part of another
student’s assignment. They were now on a watch list. Any further incidence of plagiarism in the
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third or fourth assignments would result in the notification of their cheating to the course Professor
for disciplinary actions. The script was as follows:
Dear SAM Excel User,
As noted in our previous email to you, the SAM system can detect any portion of your
project that has been copied from or shared with another SAM user. The system has
flagged one of your assignments as having been copied from or shared with another
student. This is a serious violation of academic integrity. Your name has been put on
a watch list. Any further evidence of copying or sharing your SAM Excel projects
in subsequent assignments will result in notification to your Professor for further
disciplinary actions.
The goal is have you become more proficient in Excel, which is an essential skill in
today’s workplace. Using another student’s work or sharing your work with other
students is plagiarism and can have serious consequences for your academic standing
and is detrimental to your professional development.
For the second Excel assignment in each course, Group B, and not Group A, was sent the email
above. In this phase, we compared the effect of being warned recently in group B to the effect of
having been warned earlier in the semester in group A. We expected less of an effect of the second
warning because Group A had already been warned and may have responded by less cheating.

2.3.10

C. Second Treatment: Sanctions

In the second part of the study we sent an email to any student in either Group A or B who had
been flagged for cheating on either the first or second assignment. This email informed students
that according to the software, they had shared their assignment or has used all or part of another
student’s assignment. They were now on a watch list. Any further incidence of plagiarism in the
third or fourth assignments would result in the notification of their cheating to the course Professor
for disciplinary actions. The script was as follows:
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Dear SAM Excel User,
As noted in our previous email to you, the SAM system can detect any portion of your
project that has been copied from or shared with another SAM user. The system has
flagged one of your assignments as having been copied from or shared with another
student. This is a serious violation of academic integrity. Your name has been put on
a watch list. Any further evidence of copying or sharing your SAM Excel projects
in subsequent assignments will result in notification to your Professor for further
disciplinary actions. The goal is have you become more proficient in Excel, which is an
essential skill in today’s workplace. Using another student’s work or sharing your work
with other students is plagiarism and can have serious consequences for your academic
standing and is detrimental to your professional development.

2.3.11

Additional Warnings

As noted above, cheating increased with each project during the semester in 2017 and 2018. To see
if we could stem that trend, we sent a second serious of warnings in the four courses that assigned at
least 3 projects. In one of the two courses that assigned only 3 Excel projects, we sent every student
in groups A and B the same email warning they had initially been sent one week before the third
assignment was due. In the other class with 3 Excel projects, we sent no further warnings. The
objective was to test whether additional warnings lessened the tendency for cheating to rise over the
semester. Similarly, in classes that assigned 4 projects, we sent group A the same warning on one
week before the third project and group B the warning on one week before the fourth project. Again
the goal was to test whether cheating responded in any way to the additional warnings.

2.3.12

Data

Faculty in four pre-business courses agreed to add the Excel module to their class. Two classes were
from the Accountancy Department (ACC1 and ACC2), Finance (FIN) and Management (MGT).
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Many faculty had participated in the Excel module in previous years. Prior to the experimental
semester, most students complete the required number of projects in their classes. Plagiarism rates
in the fall of 2018 varied by class and they generally increased over the course of the semester.
We randomized students within each course evenly into two groups, A and B. 764 students were
in more than 1 of the four classes. 323 of those were in group A in one class and group B in another.
We run the analysis with and without students in more than one class.
A clear concern was that students within a class but in different groups would share information
regarding the email warnings. The setting, however, was an urban commuter college in which many
students worked. Few students lived in dorms. There existed student networks but our experience
as faculty was that relatively few students know many of their classmates especially in the large
introductory classes. However, the large rates of plagiarism in the fall of 2018 was evidence of
intra-student communication. But the project of one student was often shared with multiple students.
When we called a few of the major senders, they admitted sharing their project with a friend, but
claimed they had no idea their work was being spread around so much. The answer was plausible
given the ease within which material could be sent electronically. The concern in the end appeared
unimportant because the warning had little effect on cheating.

2.4

Statistical Models

The first effect we estimate is the effect that warning students that we can detect cheating has on
their probability of cheating on subsequent projects. This treatment is randomized between group A
and B and so is orthogonal to all other treatments during the semester. We therefore can estimate a
simple model,

cikt = β0 + β1 Wit + classk + ψt + it .

(2.2)

Where c is the probability that individual i cheats in week t, and depends on whether or not
individual i is warned in time t. WE include controls for the class and week that a student submits a
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project in. We first estimate for the first project in each class only, when only treatment group A had
received a warning the week before the deadline. Note that students were randomized in each time
within class and that students could appear in multiple class and therefore could have received a
warning for some classes and not others. If they are warned in any class than they are counted as
having been warned in all classes.
The second effect we estimate is the probability that students cheat given they have been
sanctioned. We first estimate a model for the class as a whole as a time series relationship which is
equal to

Ct
Nt
/

in each week, where C is the number of submissions in which the student submitted

work that was not their own and N is the total number of submission in that week. This fraction is
overlayed with the timing of warnings and sanction for each group in each week period. We next
estimate parametrically the probability of the effect of sanctions on the probability of cheating using
the following estimating equation,

cikt = β0 + β1 Sit + classk + personi + ψt + it .

(2.3)

The additional variables include the sanction, S, telling student i at time t that they copied from
other students and would be placed on a watch list. This variable equals one at the first instance
of sanctioning for all classes they are enrolled. This time we also include person fixed effects to
account for students being much more likely to cheat given that they have been sanctioned.
Finally we’d like to get an idea for spillover effects of sanctioning. To do so we limit analysis to
students that were not sanctioned after the second project using the probability they cheat on the
third project. Here the variation comes from the average sanctioning rate within a student’s section.
The variation occurs because students can submit their third project at anytime during the semester
and that certain sections might for various reasons, like time of day classes meet in the semester,
have different levels of sanctioned students. We therefore use the following estimating equation.

cikt = β0 + β1 Sckt + classk + ψt + it .

(2.4)
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We estimate without person fixed effects since we are estimating on the third project submission
only and therefore within person, within project variation may be limited. Sc is the percent of
students in section k that had been sanctioned at time t for student i. Note that the variation comes
from the exogenous timing of sanctioning in the semester and from differences in sanctioning rates
across classes. We cluster at the section level.

2.5

Results

Table 2.1 shows the characteristics of cheaters and non-cheaters. Cheaters and non-cheaters have
a similar GPA profile with a GPA of 3.38 for cheaters and 3.37 for non-cheaters. Interestingly,
however, cheaters have much lower SAT verbal scores on average, 498.3 compared to 536.2 for
non-cheaters and somewhat lower math SAT score, 580 compared to 593.7. This implies that
cheaters come to school with lower skills and may try to make up the gap by cheating more.
Cheaters start their classes with less credits and are slightly earlier in their academic careers.
Cheaters are also more likely to Asian, equally likely to be white, and less likely to be black,
Hispanic or other. They’re also more likely to be non-English speaking at home. Running a
regression of characteristics on cheating in table 2.2, I find that the characteristics which best predict
cheating are lower SAT verbal scores, attending full-time as opposed to parttime, reporting race as
asian, and reporting a language other than english as your first language.
Despite explicitly warning students that we could detect cheating, table 2.3 shows that students
do not respond in a substantial way to this increase in their information set. The cleanest treatment,
when only group A is warned, shows an effect of -0.1 percentage points. Incorporating information
from variation in also warning group B, the before the second project due date shows that the
warning increases the probability of a cheating attempt by 0.1 percentage points. Using information
from all projects the increase in probability of cheating is 0.3 percentage points for being warned.
None are significant at conventional levels.
More evidence to this point is provided by figure 2.1. Here we focus on Finance where the
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treatments come before treatments in other classes and are therefore free from contamination of
spillover treatments from other classes. While group A has slightly lower cheating rates the week
directly following the email, their cheating rate surges above group B as the deadline for project 1
approaches. Overall the distance between the two groups tracks throughout the semester and there’s
no evidence of substantial deviations towards the beginning.
Moving on to sanctioning, we can observe in figure 2.1 the huge decline in cheating after the
occurrence of the first sanction email. While cheating typically peaked around 0.12 before the
sanction email, it tended to peak only around 0.04 around the third deadline and then only 0.02
around the fourth deadline. The interim cheating rates were also much reduced. In table 2.5 we can
see the average effects. A person that cheats and is sanctioned, reduces the probability that they
cheat on subsequent attempts by about 37.9 percentage point for finance, 39.1 for Management and
37.5 for all courses combined. From project 1 to project 2, before any sanction goes out, about half
the students that cheated on the first project, cheated on the second. This implies that cheating is
reduced by almost 4/5’s after being sanctioned.
Is there some evidence that the expected probability of getting caught increases for students
other than those that were directly sanctioned? We therefore turn focus to students that were not
sanctioned after project 2 because they were not detected to have cheated on project 1 or 2. There is
variation in the within class differences in sanctioning rates based on the number of students that
were sanctioned in your class for finance, management or the two accounting courses as well as
the other sections a student is enrolled. There is also variation based on the timing students turn in
their projects relative to when the sanction is imposed. In the cleanest case, finance, we find that an
increase around the mean of 0.06 of students having been sanctioned by students submission dates
decreases the probability of cheating among these non-sanctioned students by about 1.26 percentage
points but the effect is not significant. For management, the equivalent increase in sanctioning rates
in a students class decreases the probability they will cheat by 2.34 percentage points, and for all
courses combined by approximately 1.62 percentage points. The latter two effects are significant at
conventional levels.
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Discussion and conclusion

In this paper, we showed that warnings do not work. Students don’t take them seriously because there
is no evidence of enforcement. When students are caught cheating their subsequent cheating rates
drastically decrease because their expected probability of being caught increases. However, students
don’t just increase their punishment expectation who are directly caught cheating. Students who
themselves were not sanctioned but who were in sections with more students who were sanctioned
are less likely to cheat on subsequen project submissions. This implies students communicate
their risks and do not necessarily need to be sanctioned themselves in order to reduce cheating
probabilities.
We have found that the semesters intervention has drastically reduced cheating on even first
project attempts. In future research we will describe the nature of this decline in cheating. Is the
decline only limited to students that received sanctions, or are new students to the courses also
experiencing lower cheating rates than previous? Enforcement of sanctions is time intensive and
therefore knowing how much cheating can be limited by increasing students expectations about
getting caught is a topic of some importance.
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Figure 2.1: Finance course rate of cheating per submission over semester
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Table 2.1: Baseline characteristics of cheaters (C) and non-cheaters (NC)
C
Prior School Performance
GPA
SAT Verbal
SAT Math
Prior School Experience
Cumulative Credits
Underclass
Attends Part Time
Demographics
Age
Female
Asian
Black,Hispanic, Other
Native English Speaker

NC

NC-C

S.D.

N

3.38 3.37
-0.01 0.47
498.3 536.2 37.9*** 102.7
580.0 593.7 13.6**** 101.0

1,536
1,968
1,991

29.6
0.70
0.07

25.4
0.72
0.11

-4.3**
0.02***
0.04

21.7
0.44
0.59
0.25
0.36

21.8
0.47
0.46
0.34
0.53

0.1
-0.01
-0.13***
0.09***
0.17***

33.3
0.46
0.31

2,921
2,921
2,921

4.4 2,921
0.50 15,196
0.50 15,235
0.45 15,235
0.50 9,756

Significance levels of differences are indicated by ∗ < .1, ** < .05, *** < .01.

Table 2.2: Baseline characteristics which predict cheating

Prior School Performance
GPA/10
SAT Verbal/100
SAT Math/100
Prior School Experience
Cumulative Credits
Underclass
Attends Part Time
Demographics
Age/10
Female
Asian
Black,Hispanic, Other
Native English Speaker

-0.121 (0.40)
-0.096 (0.022)***
-0.011 (0.022)
-0.001 (0.008)
-0.045 (0.044)
-0.130 (0.048)***
0.001 (0.030)
-0.087 (0.027)
0.159 (0.036)***
-0.020 (0.038)
-0.073 (0.034)***

Significance levels of differences are indicated by ∗ < .1, ** < .05, *** < .01.
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Table 2.3: Effect of warning students we can detect cheating on whether or not they
turned in an assignment that included work from another student
(1) 1st proj. (2) 1st & 2nd proj. (3) All proj.
Warned

-0.1

0.1

0.3

(0.9)

(0.9)

(0.9)

5.1

6.5

5.1

# of Obs

5,201

10,001

16,812

# of Students

2,950

2,988

3,006

Unwarned Mean

Shows the effect of warning students that the SAM system has the ability
to detect cheating. The first column uses only the first randomized
intervention on group A that occurs for only a single group. The second
column relies on variation that turns the control into a treatment group,
while keeping group A as a treated control. The third column relies on
that same variation but extends to all projects. Standard errors are
clustered at the individual level.

Table 2.4: Effect of sanctioning students that cheat on subsequent cheating attempts
(1) Fin.

(2) MGT.

(3) All Courses

-37.9***

-39.1***

-37.5***

(3.6)

(3.8)

(2.5)

5.9

10.1

5.1

# of Obs

5,928

3,658

16,811

# of Students

1,139

972

3,006

Sanctioned
Unwarned Mean

The effect on the probability that a student cheats after being told
they have been caught using another students work The first column is
the effect in FIN, where the first sanction warning occurred, the second the
effect in MGT, the second class, and the last column the overall effect
in all classes. I include controls for section, week of semester, and
project number.
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Table 2.5: Effect of sanctions in your class on subsequent cheating attempts
(1) Fin. (2) MGT. (3) All Courses
Sanction-rate class
Unwarned Mean
# of Obs
# of Students

-0.21

-0.39***

-0.27***

(0.14)

(0.05)

(0.05)

1.9

5.1

1.9

2,287

1,181

8,721

836

702

2,434

The effect of the student’s section’s sanctioning percentage
on the probability that a non-sanctioned student cheats. The
first column is the effect in FIN, where the first sanction warning
effect in MGT, the second class, and the last column the overall
effect in all classes. I include controls for section, week
of semester, and project number.

Chapter 3
Does a good school lift all boats?
Authors: Daniel Dench (CUNY), Jesse Margolis (MarGrady Research)

3.1

Introduction

In recent decades, school choice has become more common across the United States, particularly
in urban areas. With school choice comes the challenge of understanding how we can fairly sort
students into schools while pushing for optimal educational gains for all students. Some systems
like the Charlotte-Mecklenburg and Denver system use a combination of geographic and sibling
preferences with lottery assignment for vacancies (Deming et al., 2014; Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2017).
Other systems such as New York City (NYC) use a more complicated enrollment system in which
schools can rank student applicants for various reasons related to student academic or performance
characteristics. It is of fundamental importance to answer the question of whether ranking students
in this way serves any educational purpose. This question is related to the college match literature
(Dillon and Smith, 2017, 2018), which asks whether relatively lower-performing students who
attend high performing schools do worse than their peers who enter the school with a performance
level closer to the school average.
In this study, we investigate the question of whether students that just miss margins for screening
mechanisms are differently affected by admission than those who are far away from cutoffs at two
68
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popular programs in NYC. We can do this due to a unique set of admission programs to schools in
NYC where half of assignments are made based on screening and the other half based on lottery.
We sort the lottery sample into ranking quartiles after cutoffs and estimate school assignment effects
on outcomes through lottery assignment at various distances to the cutoff. We show how different
their counterfactual school enrollment is based on distance to the cutoff, to illustrate the challenge
of estimating school effects for different groups of students.
This is a topic explored by Angrist and Rokkanen (2015) for elite schools in Boston. However,
whereas they could only say something about the quasi-marginal student for entry into elite schools,
we can answer this question for students very unlikely to be admitted through a selective process
at high demand but not elite schools. Our paper is relevant for answering the question of whether
there is any educational purpose to screening more widely, rather than for elite schools.
Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2019) find that lottery assignment and screened assignment students
at “grade A”, determined by NYC accountability measures, gain the same from assignment to
“grade A” schools as those that make it in through lotteries. However screened programs and
lottery programs can be at different programs and schools. The treatment, therefore, in these two
groups is not necessarily fixed and the comparisons to counterfactuals schools therefore haphazard.
In contrast, by holding the treatment constant, we can say something more concretely about the
comparison of the treatment to the counterfactual school for the screened versus the lottery sample.
This would be important if the average screened student were to have better alternative opportunities
in comparison to the lottery group.
The first finding of this paper is that there is no concrete evidence that students that just miss the
screening admission cutoffs gain anything more, as measured by the Regents graduation rate, by
attending a popular, high quality "grade A" school than their lesser ranked peers. In fact, students
far away from the cutoff gain somewhat more than their higher-ranked peers, though not outside of
confidence bounds. The counterfactual school enrollment, i.e. school characteristics of the school
that students attend when they don’t win the lottery, is different for these groups, however. Students
further away from the cutoff slip further in peer quality measures, but less in school pupil spending
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measures and student to full time equivalent faculty measures. School value-added measures based
on prior year outcomes, show somewhat of a wash in terms of gains, suggesting students further
away from the cutoff do not slip any more or less in this aggregate measure. These results are
supported by a group of “good” schools showing the finding are more broadly applicable.
The second finding of this paper is another popular school, ranked as "B", negatively affects
student Regents graduation rate, with larger negative effects further away from the cutoff. Once
again, students that lose lotteries close to the cutoff fall less in terms of peer quality measures
than students far away from the cutoff. The key is that school quality measures such as per-pupil
expenditures and student to staff ratios are actually better at alternative schools than this popular
program. School value-added measures based on prior year outcomes show somewhat of a wash in
terms of gains, suggesting students further away from the cutoff do not slip anymore or less in this
aggregate measure and increasingly so for students further away from the cutoff. Students that lose
the lottery have similar gains in school-value added measures regardless of where they fall relative
to the cutoff. These results are supported by a group of “poor” schools.
This study advances the literature in a few important ways. By showing that students gain about
equally by attending a high-quality schools and lose by attending a low-quality school, it provides
evidence against "matching" students to high schools based on their academic skill. Second, by
fixing treatments and showing counterfactual school quality measures, we observe the complete
picture for school effects.

3.2

Deferred acceptance, and NYC school assignment mechanisms

NYC public schools use the Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm to decide which students get
offers to schools. The most straightforward explanation comes from Pathak (2017):
“Step 1) Each student proposes to her first choice. Each school tentatively assigns seats to its
proposers one at a time, following their priority order. Any remaining proposers are rejected.”
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“Step k) Each student who was rejected in the previous step proposes to her next best choice.
Each school considers the students it has been holding together with its new proposers and tentatively
assigns its seats to these students one at a time following the school’s priority order. Any remaining
proposers are rejected.
"The algorithm terminates either when there are no new proposals or when the rejected students
have exhausted their preference lists.”
In New York City, students can choose up to 12 programs in the first matching round. There
can be multiple programs per high school, and each program within a school can have its own
assignment mechanisms. Programs might put more emphasis on one part of the curriculum or
another, but they can take general classes with students from other programs.
In New York City, there are two general types of assignment mechanism. They are screening
and lottery assignment. Screened schools rank students based on criteria that can be limited to a
single test or a combination of factors, such as standardized test scores, grades, attendance, auditions
and/or interviews. They do not have information about how the students list them as a preference.
In contrast, lottery assignment is based on a randomly drawn number that is drawn once for each
student in the HS match process.
The process is only slightly complicated by priority groups. Schools can set priority groups
based on criteria such as being within the catchment zone, community school district, or borough
of the school. Until recently, a group of schools also prioritized those students who went to an
information session about the school. Admission proceeds from the 1st to the kth priority group,
with offers going to the 1st priority group before the kth. If there are more students in the kth
priority group than the number of available spots then admissions are decided by the assignment
mechanism, either screened or lottery.
Educational Option programs use a combination of 50% screening and 50% lottery assignment.
In addition, 16% of spots are available for low ELA category students, 68% are available for high
ELA category students, and 16% of spots are available for high ELA category students. ELA
categories are based on a state administered test. While the goal is to target reading categories
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at these percentages, high, middle and low category demand do not always meet these capacities.
In this case, middle performers are given second priority for all the high and low category seats,
while low performers are given second priority at middle category seats. Low performers, middle
performers, and high performers are given final priority at high, middle, and low category seats
respectively (Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2019).

3.3

NYC HS school match data and sample restrictions

We received data for the 2005-2006 to 2008-2009 high school matching process from the New York
City Department of Education (NYCDOE). The data contain students’ preferences on high schools
in preference order from 1 to 12, how students’ preferences rank each student, their priority groups
and student characteristics such as their standardized test scores in math and reading in 7th grade,
their grades in courses in middle school, their absenteeism in 7th grade, where they attended middle
school, and whether they were students with disability or not.
Separately, the DOE provided data on high school enrollment and student characteristics
including gender, race/ethnicity, English language learner learning (ELL) status, and poverty status
with linked id’s to the high school match data. These data were provided for the school years
2004-2005 to 2016-2017. We also received outcome data on regents test scores, 4-year graduation
outcomes, college enrollment, and SAT scores for the same years.
There are several sample restrictions we place on the data for the purpose of estimating differential program effects on students on the margin of the screened sample versus lottery students. First,
we want to make comparisons across the students ranking distribution where there is less than a
probability of 1 or more than a probability of zero for students to be accepted. This requires that we
restrict school effect estimation to schools that have more demand than capacity. For this reason,
we illustrate effects of assignment to two popular programs in the NYC school system. We then
move to the effect of assignment to collections of schools that we classify into two types, “good” or
“poor”.
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We limit the sample to middle reading category students. Middle reading category students are,
not surprisingly, the largest group of applicants within a school. This affords us the most power
when we split the sample based on distance to the screened cutoff. For the same reason, we also
limit to only students without disability as they are considered separately from the general pool
of applicants in the admissions process. In addition, this group, middle reading category students
without disability, has the biggest range in student preparation levels and therefore the most potential
for differences in treatment effects and counterfactual school comparisons based on distance to the
screening cutoff.

3.4

Fixing treatments, why it is important

When a treatment effect is measured for a school, it is the difference between two effects (measured
across many different students). For each student, you have the effect of school attendance at the
treatment school minus the effect of treatment at the student’s next choice, their counterfactual. In
Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2019), they measure the effect of attendance at "grade A" schools and find
the effect to be nearly identical in magnitude for lottery and screened students. What we can’t know
is if this identical treatment effect is produced by identical treatment effects at grade A schools or
differing average counterfactuals. Equation 1 illustrates the distinction.

Yi = αi + β1 Si + β2 Si∗ .

(3.1)

Y is an educational outcome of person i, S is attendance at a treatment school of interest for
person i, and S* is attendance at wherever person i will attend if they do not attend school i. What
Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2019) and others in the school choice literature are measuring when they
measure the effect of school S, they are not actually measuring β1 but rather β1 minus β2 . Since
people who qualify for screened assignment schools and those that qualify for lottery assignment
schools have the potential to have much different S ∗ , it is not clear whether β1 and β2 for lottery
and screened assignment students is the same or if (β1 − β2 ) is the same but β1 and β2 different.
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Even if we could be certain that β1 and β2 are the same across student assignments, we would not
know if they were the same because school quality is equal across their assignment or if there are
differing school qualities across their assignments with heterogeneity in treatment effects. This is
because Si is not fixed across assignments.
By fixing Si across assignments, as we do in this paper, we can at least be certain that the school
quality is the same and that differences in β1 , if any, must be due to heterogeneity in treatment
effects. What we cannot do and what Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2019) also cannot do is fix Si∗ between
lottery and screening assignments. What we can do is estimate the changes in characteristics for
assignment to school S and measure the differences in these changes depending on distance to the
cutoff.

3.5

Identification

Conditional on being a middle reading category student there are only a few things that affect your
probability of being admitted to an Ed Opt program. Shown in Figure 1 is the probability that
an applicant gets an offer at one of the most popular Ed Opt program, which we call Program Y,
conditional on their rank percentile. Rank percentile is the percentile a student’s rank falls in, in
relation to all ranked students at program Y including those that do not demand the school. As
shown in the figure, the probability that an applicant gets an offer is equal to one before the screening
cutoff. To the right of the screening cutoff, the probability drops to approximately 0.15, and is
unaffected by an applicants distance to the cut point (since admission is determined by lottery).
Observations are binned to show the average around those rank percentiles. Program Y is labeled a
grade "A" in all 4 years of enrollment by NYC due to its graduation rates, truancy rates, and other
factors, both compared to schools citywide and to schools that serve students with similar incoming
characteristics. Figure 2 shows the probability that a student gets an offer at a similarly popular
program to which NYC gave a grade of "B" in 3 of the 4 years of enrollment and a grad of “A” in
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Figure 3.1: Probability of admission to program Y given ranking
the last year.1
In order to look at assignment to each of these programs, we can use simple lottery estimation,
instrumenting attendance at the school with an indicator for whether students received an offer to
the school. We control for the choice number students applied to the program, which given a single
lottery number can affect probability of an offer. We also control for year indicators since there
can be different capacities and demands depending on the year which also affects the probability of
admission.
Figure 3 illustrates how we break up estimation of effects at various distances to the cutoffs. It
shows the same probability of assignment to program Y, but this time we shade the regions where
1

Why did we choose these two schools? They are two of the most popular programs among NYC Ed Op programs
of the time period, they have similarly good data in each year with standard ranking methods, and they contrast with
one another by their NYC grade.
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Figure 3.3: Probability of admission to program X given ranking
estimation of effects occurs. We used four zones that represent about equal sample sizes. Since
programs do not rank every person, we also estimate the effects for those that do not have a rank,
since they receive an offer at the same as the constant probability of all lottery students.
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Table 3.1: Academic Characteristics by school and school ranking category
School Y
1
GPA
7th Grade Math
7th Grade Read
7th days absent

2

3

School X
4

None

86.1 84.1 81.0 81.2
0.44 0.39 0.06 0.20
0.18 0.14 0.00 0.03
5.8
5.5
6.6
8.8

76.1
-0.17
-0.10
16.7

1

2

3

4

None

87.0 82.4 78.4 76.2
0.54 0.26 0.06 0.03
0.20 0.10 0.02 0.03
4.9 7.0 11.4 18.0

76.3
0.05
-0.01
12.9

7th grade math and reading are measured in standard deviations to the average score. The categories
correspond to equal sample size groups where category 1 is closest to the cutoff and category 4 is furthest
away from the cutoff. The none categories students were not ranked by the schools.

3.6

Results

Table 1 shows the characteristics of students at various distances to the cutoff. For the most part, as
we get further away from the cutoff in both schools, we see that the average GPA and test scores
decline while absences increase. The exception is categories 3 and 4 for school Y in which their
characteristics are reversed. Presumably this school was using criteria other than these measures
to rank students at this distance to the cutoff. It is always true that ranking category 1 students
have higher performance than the other categories. Students who are not ranked tend to have lower
GPAs, lower test scores, and more day absent than ranked students. Note that the reading scores
are somewhat more compressed than the math scores. This is because we have limited to middle
reading category students.
Table 2 shows the effect of lottery assignment to both of these schools on various measures.
Despite both schools being similarly popular, the outcome of assignment is almost reversed. Students
who attend School Y (the “A” school) due to the lottery are 8 percentage points more likely to
graduate than if they had attended another school due to losing the lottery. By contrast, students who
attend School X (the “B” school) due to the lottery are 6 percentage points less likely to graduate
than if they had attended another school due to losing the lottery.
2

2

Clearly these differences

A regents diploma means students have both fulfilled their course requirements and passed at least five Regents
tests, which are standardized across New York State high schools. This means that graduation from high school in NYC
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Table 3.2: Effects of assignment to school Y and X on
Regent’s Diploma, peer and school characteristics

Regents Diploma
Average student GPA
Average student absenteeism
Per Pupil Expenditure
Student to fte ratio
School value-added

School Y

School X

0.08∗∗
(0.03)
3.90∗∗∗
(0.18)
-3.44∗∗∗
(0.18)
25.00
(61.04)
-1.60∗∗∗
(0.18)
0.05∗∗∗
(0.01)

-0.06∗∗∗
(0.02)
6.54∗∗∗
(0.15)
-4.90∗∗∗
(0.15)
-241.75∗∗∗
(5.5)
0.44∗∗∗
(0.17)
-0.014∗∗∗
(0.01)

Significance levels are indicated by ∗ < .1, ** < .05, *** < .01.

are not as a result of peer quality changes. In fact, School X peer quality is higher in terms of
average entering GPA by 6.5 percentage points and lower absenteeism by 4.9 days in comparison to
students’ counterfactual school option. In contrast, at School Y, the average student GPA is only 3.9
percentage points higher and absenteeism 3.4 days lower than its counterfactual.
The key is that although the peer characteristic changes are more drastic for students that miss
out on School X, important quality measures change move in a positive direction for students
that make it in to School Y, and a negative direction for students that win the lottery for school
X. Per pupil expenditures are marginally higher in School Y and student to full-time-equivalent
faculty ratios are smaller. By contrast, in School X, per pupil expenditures are lower than their
counterfactual and student to full-time-equivalent faculty ratios higher. The aggregate effect is that
students that make it in to School Y increase their school value-added by roughly 5 percentage points
in comparison to their counterfactual while School x students decrease their school value-added by
roughly 1.4 percentage points.3
is less subjective, since all students that graduate must pass at least this sufficient condition.
3
school value-added is measured by predicting regents graduation based on a quartic in entry grade point average,
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Figure 3.4: Effects on regents graduation of assignment to school X or Y by student rank category
Figure 4 shows the effect on Regents graduation of assignment by ranking category. In both
graphs the effect of assignment to these schools grows in absolute value as we proceed through
ranking categories. The left panel shows the effects in School Y and the right panel School X. Due
to imprecision, we cannot say that a ranking in category 4 has effect significantly different from a
ranking in category 1. An f-test on a regression of regents graduation on an indicator for whether
they win the lottery interacted with rank groups reveals that we cannot reject the null hypothesis
that students lose more depending on their rank group relative to group 1 from winning the lottery
for school X (p=0.58). The same test for school Y is marginally significant (p=0.0532).Can the
pattern in these results be explained by differences in changes in peer characteristics?
Figure 5 shows the effect on peer characteristics of assignment by ranking category. In both
schools, the effect of assignment to these schools changes as we proceed through ranking categories.
This time, however, the effects proceed in the same direction. In both cases the peer GPA increases
more by assignment to school X or Y the further students are away from the cutoff. A similar
pattern holds for peer days of absence. In other words, students closer to the cutoff likely have
counterfactual options that are better in peer quality than students farther from the cutoff.
math scores, reading scores, and absenteeism and a set of indicator variables for each school in NYC and forced through
the origin. The coefficients on the indicator variables show the average increase in the probability of Regents graduation
away from what would be predicted based on a student’s entering characteristics. These coefficients get assigned as a
school’s value-added measure. Students get assigned a value-added from a predicted equation that excludes their own
years cohort to avoid contamination of outcomes on value-added measures.
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Effects of school X attendance on average entering GPA

95% confidence intervals
Red line is mean effect

95% confidence intervals
Red line is mean effect

3

1

4

2

School Effect
5
6
7

School Effect
3
4

8

5

9

Effects of school Y attendance on average entering GPA

1

2

3
Rank Percentile Group

4

None

1

2

3
Rank Percentile Group

4

None

95% confidence intervals
Red line is mean effect

−8

−4

−7

School Effect
−6
−5
−4

School Effect
−3
−2

−3

−2

Effects of school X attendance on average entering days absent

95% confidence intervals
Red line is mean effect
−1

Effects of school Y attendance on average entering days absent

1

2

3
Rank Percentile Group

4

None

1

2

3
Rank Percentile Group

4

None

Figure 3.5: Effects on peer characteristics of assignment to school X or Y by student rank category
Figure 6 shows the effect on school input measures of assignment by ranking category. School
quality effects for school Y are actually smaller for students further away from the cutoff. The same
is true for student to full time equivalent faculty ratios. All effects are imprecise enough to say that
in fact students at various distances to the cutoff might experience similar changes in these input
measures. At best, we can say that it supports effects not being much different the further students
are from the cutoff.
Finally, Figure 7 uses the aggregate value-added measure as an outcome. Here, it is even more
clear that there is little difference by rank category in students’ counterfactual school quality. This
implies that any differences we detect in Regents graduation may be due to actual differences in
treatment effects for these students.
The conclusions we can draw from two schools is somewhat limited. It is possible, however, to
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Figure 3.6: Effects on school quality measures of assignment to school X or Y by student rank
category
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Figure 3.7: Effects on regents graduation of assignment to school X or Y by student rank category
pool similar schools. What I want to do is pool all schools similar to school Y, "good" schools, and
all school’s similar to school X, "poor" schools. I could group all schools that have positive effects
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Table 3.3: Characteristics in NYC High Schools, "Good"
Schools and "Poor" Schools

Female
White
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Poverty Status
English Language Learners
Absent
Scaled Math Score
Scaled Reading Score
Grade Point Average

NYC

"Good"

"Poor"

0.48
0.13
0.33
0.40
0.13
0.79
0.10
14.5
0.0
0.0
78.1

0.44
0.13
0.20
0.55
0.12
0.85
0.13
14.1
-0.11
-0.08
77.4

0.51
0.10
0.40
0.39
0.11
0.87
0.10
14.7
-0.11
-0.09
76.1

Good schools are defined as those whose lottery assignment z-scores
are greater than 1.15. Bad schools are defined as those whose lottery
assignment z-scores are less than 1.15.

and all schools that have a negative effect on regents gradation estimated with lottery assignment,
but many of the schools included in this exercise may be mistakenly categorized due to random
noise. Instead I will classify all schools with lottery assignment regents graduation z-scores greater
than 1.15 as "good" schools, and all schools with lottery assignment regents graduation z-scores
less than -1.15 as "poor" schools. This lowers the probability of mis-assignment for any one school
to just 12.5%.
Out of 89 high demand Educational Option programs, I assign 13 "good" schools, and 18 "poor"
schools using this procedure. The rest are not categorized Table 3 shows the characteristics of the
lottery groups of these schools in comparison to NYC High schools. "Good" schools are somewhat
more Hispanic and less black than NYC high schools, while "poor" schools are somewhat more
black and less Hispanic. Both "good" schools and "poor" schools have somewhat higher poverty
status, lower math and lower reading scores than NYC high schools overall.
Table 4 shows quite the contrast in "good" schools and "poor" schools. "Good" schools produce
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Table 3.4: Effects of assignment to "good" Schools and "poor"
Schools on Regent’s Diploma, peer and school characteristics

Regents Diploma
Average student GPA
Average student absenteeism
Per Pupil Expenditure
Student to fte ratio
School value-added

Good School

Poor School

0.11∗∗∗
(0.02)
2.80 ∗∗∗
(0.10)
-2.95∗∗∗
(0.11)
-121.2∗∗∗
(32.0)
-0.99∗∗∗
(0.09)
0.04∗∗∗
(0.00)

-0.11∗∗∗
(0.01)
3.7∗∗∗
(0.07)
-3.63∗∗∗
(0.08)
-365.2∗∗∗
(21.5)
1.0∗∗∗
(0.05)
-0.04∗∗∗
(0.00)

Significance levels are indicated by ∗ < .1, ** < .05, *** < .01.

an increase in regents diploma graduation of 11 percentage points while "poor" schools produce
a decrease in regents graduation rates of 11 percentage points. While peer effects are once again
somewhat equally affected, by assignment to "good" or "poor" schools, school characteristic changes
show that per pupil expenditures decrease much more for "poor" schools. Student to full-time faculty
ratios decline for "good" schools and increase for "poor" schools. Finally, the school value-added
measure increases for "good" schools while it decreases for "poor" schools.
Moving to estimation by rank percentile groups for "good" and "poor" schools, in figure 8 I
show the effects by groups. Here the patterns for both "good" and "poor" schools show an even
more equivocal effect across rank percentile groups. If I estimate a reduced form equation with
lottery assignment interacted with rank percentile groups, I can not reject the null hypothesis that
the effects on regents graduation of assignment to "good" or "poor" schools in categories 2-4 and
none are equal to the effects on category 1.
Figure 9 shows effects on peer characteristics. The pattern of increasing peer quality effects
depending on category is similar to our example schools for both "good" and "poor" schools.
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Effects of poor school attendance on regents graduation
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Figure 3.8: Effects on regents graduation of assignment to "good" or "bad" school by student rank
category
Figure 10 shows the school quality effects where no consistent pattern emerges, supporting that
counterfactual school quality is similar depending on rank percentile group. Finally figure 11, shows
the value-added measure of quality, showing by rank percentile group effects are similar.
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Effects of poor school attendance on average entering GPA
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Figure 3.9: Effects on peer characteristics of assignment to school X or Y by student rank category
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Effects of poor school attendance on pp. expenditure
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Figure 3.10: Effects on school quality measures of assignment to "good" or "bad" schools by student
rank category
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Figure 3.11: Effects on regents graduation of assignment to school X or Y by student rank category
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Conclusion

In this paper, we’ve shown that effects of high quality schools and lesser quality schools do not vary
in any significant way by distance to ranking cutoffs. If anything students that are further away from
the cutoff gain or lose more from assignment to high quality and low quality schools respectively.
This runs counter to the narrative that there is a match quality for students and that highly prepared
students should get priority through screening processes.
We also find that measures of peer quality are not terribly predictive in how students will be
effected by assignment. The direction of changes in peer quality by ranking category runs counter
to the direction of changes in regents score by ranking category. Instead school effects likely swamp
peer effects in this case.
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